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INTRODUCTION 
The manner in which the United States satisfies its energy needs 
over the next quarter century will determine the relative health of the 
country physically,1 politically,2 environmentally,3 and economically.4  
By 2030, the nation will see a 36% rise in electricity consumption.5  
Already the largest energy consumption sector,6 electric power sector 
needs will outpace the transmission grid’s distribution capacity7 and the 
country’s ability to absorb the deleterious financial effects of fossil fuel-
based energy.8  Congress must respond. 
Respiratory illness, cancer, neurological disorders, and birth defects 
caused by fossil fuels cost the country billions of dollars a year.9  These 
billions of dollars, public health entitlements notwithstanding, represent 
a mass siphoning of capital that would otherwise, in the form of 
commerce or workforce participation, contribute to the domestic 
 1. See Conrad G. Schneider, Clean Air Task Force, Dirty Air, Dirty Power: 
Mortality and Health Damage Due to Air Pollution from Power Plants 7-15, June 2004 
(citing Abt Associates, Inc., infra note 8). 
 2. See Western Hemisphere Energy Security: Testimony Before Comm. on Int’l 
Relations Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of Karen A. 
Harbert, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy); U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Section 1837: National Security Review of 
International Energy Requirement, 34-35 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy, National Security Review]. 
 3. See Alan Nogee et al., Powerful Solutions: 7 Ways to Switch America to 
Renewable Energy, at 4 (Jan. 1999). 
 4. See id. at 7. 
 5. See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2007: With Projections to 
2030, at 138, DOE/EIA-0383(2007) (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Annual Energy Outlook 
2007]. 
 6. Energy Info. Admin., Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, DOE/EIA-
0035(2007/03), at 25 (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Monthly Energy Review: March 2007].  
The electric power sector comprises sellers of electricity, namely utility companies and 
independent power producers.  Id. at 176.  This is distinguished from so-called “end-
use” sectors of the economy: residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation.  Id. 
 7. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study 4 (May 2002) 
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study]. 
 8. See Abt Associates, Inc., The Particulate-Related Health Benefits of Reducing 
Power Plant Emissions, 6-3 to 6-4 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.cleartheair.org/ 
fact/mortality/mortalityabt.pdf; see also Schneider, supra note 1, at 22 (listing the 
projected health costs and benefits under several proposals facing Congress). 
 9. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 22. 
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economy.10  The federal government is clearly complicit in allowing the 
status quo, for which individual policymakers ought to be ashamed.  But 
more constructive is the fact that the solution is cognizable and can be 
implemented in a way that solves the mutually reinforcing crises of 
electricity demand,11 infrastructural antiquation,12 rising energy costs,13 
and soaring public and private health care expenses,14 not to mention 
going a long way toward providing the environment an overdue 
respite.15
In applying the principles of both giants of twentieth century 
economic theory, demand-side and supply-side fiscal policy,16 Congress 
can cost-effectively and with minimal administrative oversight,17 change 
the course of American energy use.18  Furthermore, it can tailor its 
legislation to be compatible with existing industrial interests while 
spreading the benefits of lower emissions and reduced externality costs 
to the vast majority of the population.19  The states have already set the 
example.20
 10. Id. at 12 (citing findings that over three million work days every year are lost 
because of the impact of power plants in the United States). 
 11. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 5-6 (noting that 
transmission bottlenecks increase electricity costs). 
 12. See id. at 3 (explaining how the electricity transmission system was developed 
piecemeal over 100 years by vertically integrated utilities in geographically diverse 
areas). 
 13. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
 14. See Abt Associates, Inc., supra note 8, at 6-3 to 6-4. 
 15. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/ 
climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm [hereinafter IPCC Report] (arguing that fossil fuels 
cause climate change, which in turn causes widespread environmental damage and 
massive public and private insurance risks). 
 16. See David Storobin, American Economic Policy from 1920’s to 1990’s, Global 
Politician (online magazine), May 9, 2005, http://www.globalpolitician.com/ 
articleshow.asp?ID=700&cid=1&sid=45 (providing a historical overview of supply-
side economics). 
 17. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: How It 
Works and Why It’s Needed (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.awea.org/pubs 
/factsheets/RPSHowWhy.pdf [hereinafter RPS Overview] (explaining how regulatory 
oversight of a renewable portfolio standard is minimal). 
 18. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Successful Strategies: Renewable Energy 
Standards (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean 
_energy/Climate-Solutions-RES-12-06-Update.pdf [hereinafter Successful Strategies]. 
 19. See infra notes 442-520. 
 20. See Successful Strategies, supra note 18; Database of State Incentives for 
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By incentivizing renewable power sources and mandating the 
production, distribution, and consumption of their output, the 
government can effectively make good on a public mandate for cleaner, 
cheaper, more reliable energy.21  To do this it needs to continue to 
implement methodology it already employs in the form of tax credits,22 
capital financing assistance,23 and generalized production incentives24—
all supply-side principles that have effectively resulted in the growth of 
the renewable energy industry to this point.25  The expansion of the 
supply-side tract must be met with an equally vigorous demand-side 
campaign.26  Like a parent giving a push to a child’s sled atop a snowy 
hill, Congress must simply dictate the industry’s trajectory and provide 
it catalytic force to supply the direction and momentum needed to 
encourage self-sustaining investment. 
Part I of this Note will address some examples of the health and 
environmental consequences of fossil fuels and touch on methods used 
for monetizing these externalities.27  In particular it will focus on coal-
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, 
available at http://www.dsireusa.org (follow links to “Summary Tables” and then to 
“Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy”) [hereinafter DSIRE Website] (charting 
various state-offered tax incentives, rebates, grants, and loans). 
 21. See Lori Bird & Blair Swezey, Green Power Marketing in the United States: A 
Status Report (Ninth Edition), NREL/TP-640-40904, at 26 (Nov. 2006) (analyzing the 
growth of the “green power market” attributable to “demand-side stimuli”); see also 
Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Windpower Outlook 2006, available at 
http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/pdf/Outlook_2006.pdf [hereinafter Wind Outlook 
2006] (citing a Yale public opinion poll that found that 86% of Americans favor 
increased funding for renewable energy). 
 22. Janet L. Sawin, Worldwatch Inst.,  National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons 
for the Advancement & Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World 
18 (Jan. 2004). 
 23. See Fred Beck & Eric Martinot, Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers, in 
Encyclopedia of Energy (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.martinot.info/Beck_Martinot_AP.pdf (manuscript at 10-13). 
 24. See Renewable Energy Prod. Incentive, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2005). 
 25. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 22 (listing subsidies, rebates, and net 
metering rules along with tax incentives as having contributed most to the rise of 
renewable energy during the 1990s and 2000s). 
 26. Cf. Paul Gipe, Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms 12 (Feb. 17, 2006), 
available at http://www.wind-works.org (“Subsidies alone [including “capital 
investment” and tax incentives] are never a sufficient support mechanism.”). 
 27. See infra notes 88-93. 
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based energy, the market-share leader in electricity28 and the biggest 
threat to public health and the environment.29  As an answer to fossil 
fuel hegemony, Part II will examine the progress and potential of wind 
power,30 its technological improvement,31 receptivity to government 
initiative,32 response to investment structure,33 and the market wind 
already enjoys as exemplified in electricity consumption data.34  Part III 
will review state and federal renewable energy policies, with particular 
attention to wind power, that have supply-side and demand-side 
impacts.35  Part IV addresses the technical and regulatory challenges 
facing wind energy and other renewables, including transmission access 
rules,36 output variability37 and storage techniques,38 power grid 
integration,39 and infrastructural modernization.40  Technical solutions 
for many of these challenges offered by experts will be addressed.41  
Finally, Part V will integrate examples of supply-side and demand 
 28. See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Coal Report 2005, DOE/EIA-0584(2005), at 
8 (Oct. 2006); see also Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 100 
(listing the amount of energy generated in kilowatt hours from various fossil fuel and 
renewable energy sources). 
 29. See generally Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren, The Social Cost of Coal: A 
Tale of Market Failure and Market Solution (Appalachian State Univ. Dept. of Econ. 
Working Paper Series, Sept. 30, 2002) (discussing the social costs, or “externalities,” of 
coal-based electricity). 
 30. See infra notes 102-212. 
 31. See Int’l Energy Agency, Long Term Research and Development Needs for 
Wind Energy for the TimeFrame 2000 to 2020, at 2-4 (Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Wind 
Energy R&D]. 
 32. See Energy Info. Admin., Policies to Promote Non-hydro Renewable Energy in 
the United States and Selected Countries 8 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter Policies to Promote 
Renewables]; Ari Reeves, Wind Energy for Electric Power: A REPP Issue Brief 20-22 
(Fredric Beck ed., Renewable Energy Policy Project July 2003). 
 33. See Ryan Wisner & Edward Kahn, Energy & Env’t Div., Lawrence Berkeley 
Nat’l Lab., Alternative Windpower Ownership Structures: Financing Terms and Project 
Costs 19-21 (May 1996). 
 34. See infra notes 165-206. 
 35. See generally Gipe, supra note 26 (addressing supply-side policy theory). 
 36. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5. 
 37. Id. at 4-5. 
 38. See Int’l Energy Agency, Variability of Wind Power and Other Renewables: 
Management Options and Strategies 27 (June 2005) [hereinafter Variability of Wind 
Power]. 
 39. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 6. 
 40. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 5. 
 41. See infra notes 365-90. 
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policy initiatives into a comprehensive renewable energy policy 
proposal.42
I. THE FINANCIAL FALLACY OF FOSSIL FUELS 
Electricity markets in the United States are dominated by fossil 
fuels, and under current predictions, that fact is unlikely to change.43  In 
February 2007 the Energy Information Administration (the “EIA”), a 
branch of the Department of Energy, released their Annual Energy 
Outlook, a projection of electricity production to 2030.44  Using current 
trends, the EIA contends that fossil fuels will continue to account for the 
bulk of American electricity production for the next two and half 
decades.45  Currently, 50% of domestic electricity production comes 
from coal,46 with an additional 15% from natural gas,47 and 20% from 
nuclear sources48—making up the overwhelming majority of the 
domestic electricity market.49  Projections bear these trends out for the 
foreseeable future.50  Renewable energy, by contrast—with the 
exception of hydro power (e.g. Niagara Falls and the Hoover Dam)51—
has largely failed to catch on because of the high costs associated with 
production and transmission,52 variable output,53 and the perception that 
a long-term market does not exist for these energies.54  Wind, 
photovoltaic (solar), geothermal, and biomass are the leading non-hydro 
sources of electricity currently available in the United States.55  
 42. See infra notes 404-520. 
 43. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 7 (graphing projected energy 
consumption by fuel type and illustrating that future hydropower and non-hydro 
renewables consumption comprise only a small fraction). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 14. 
 46. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14. 
 51. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. 
 52. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 4-5. 
 53. See id. at 4. 
 54. Cf. H. Sterling Burnett, Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Wind Power: Red Not 
Green 1-2 (Feb. 23, 2004) (arguing that the tax credits and accelerated depreciation 
given wind power show that wind is not yet competitive with traditional fuel sources). 
 55. See generally Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy Trends 2004 (Aug. 
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Combined, however, they account for only about 2.5% of the nation’s 
electric power sector consumption.56  Unless the government changes 
how energy production costs are reflected, the status quo ought to 
endure for fossil fuels and renewables alike. 
Under current federal pricing measurements, coal is the least 
expensive source of electricity57 (the EIA does not compile comparable 
production price statistics for renewables, but the International Energy 
Agency estimates that utility-scale wind energy costs in the United 
States are close to that of natural gas in “high quality wind regimes”).58  
According to the EIA, the cost of coal at electric generating plants in 
2006 averaged $1.70 in nominal dollars per million British thermal units 
2005) (showing statistics highlighting these sources as the leading renewables in 
producing power). 
 56. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35 (999 trillion Btu 
out of 39,710 total in 2006). 
 57. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 174. 
 58. Int’l Energy Agency, Renewable Energy: Market and Policy Trends in IEA 
Countries 656 (2004) [hereinafter Renewable Energy Report].  According to a 
Renewable Energy Policy Project (REPP) analysis, “Utility-scale wind farms in the 
U.S. produce wind power at a levelized cost of approximately [$0.02 to $0.06] per 
kilowatt hour. . . .  [W]hile the cost of energy of a particular wind project is relatively 
straightforward, the comparison of the cost of wind generation to other types of 
generation is often controversial,” owing to the fact that levelized cost statistics, used to 
estimate wind production cost, include the “annual cost of recovering the total capital 
costs plus the recurring costs such as operations and maintenance and royalty payments 
divided by annual expected output.”  Reeves, supra note 32, at 11.  The EIA’s fossil 
fuel production cost statistics are not measured on the basis of levelized cost.  See id. at 
12.  To illustrate, the author cited a 2001 conference paper issued by Ronald L. Lehr, 
John Nielsen, Steven Andrews, and Michael Milligan of the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory.  Id.  See Ronald L. Lehr et al., Colorado Public Utility 
Commission’s Xcel Wind Decision, NREL/CP-500-30551 (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windpoweringamerica/pdfs/xcel_wind_decision.pdf).  The 
conference paper involved a 1999 contract award decision made by the Colorado Public 
Utility Commission on a “head-to-head” comparison between natural gas and wind.  
The commission initially chose to give the contract to the natural gas generator based 
on “low natural gas costs, low capacity value for wind, and high wind ancillary service 
costs,” but reconsidered and found the wind power bid was “‘justified on purely 
economic grounds’” as long as gas prices were more than $3.50 per million cubic feet 
in light of the fair capacity value of the wind project (49 MW for a 162 MW project) 
and the fact that “ancillary services to back up new wind power are not a major cost.”  
Reeves, supra note 32, at 12.  For more on levelized cost, see infra note 154 and 
accompanying text. 
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(“Btu”).59  Petroleum and gas, the other fossil fuels that are used in 
electricity production, do not compare with coal’s low cost.60  
Furthermore, while the cost of production of coal-based electricity has in 
fact gone up considerably in the last ten years,61 the EIA does not 
project any rise between now and 2030 to be more dramatic than 0.1% 
in real dollars per year.62  Thus, there is no reason to expect the status 
quo of the electricity market to change without outside action.  Since 
coal supplies in the United States are plentiful,63 limiting coal-burning 
will not reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy.64
The casus belli for such outside action is the fact that the 
government’s pricing figures neglect to factor in the full costs of fossil 
fuel production, including environmental and health costs that are not 
passed onto consumers directly in their utility bill.65  For example, 
utility companies do not have to account for the consequences of 
approximately six billion metric tons per year of carbon dioxide 
emissions, a total that will increase to nearly eight billion metric tons per 
year by 2030, a twenty-five-year increase of about 30%.66  Nor is a 
financial charge indexed to other consequences of fossil fuel burning.  
Increases in the emission of sulfur, methane, carbon monoxide, nitrogen 
oxides, ozone, volatile organic compounds, and other particulate matter 
 59. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135. 
 60. Id.  Petroleum is broken into three subcategories, residential fuel oil 
($8.02/mmBtu),distillate fuel oil ($12.98/mmBtu), and petroleum coke ($1.29/mmBtu). 
Id.  This accounts for less than 1% of coal’s consumption.  Id. at 104.  Natural gas costs 
$6.89 per mmBtu, up from $1.98 in 1995.  Id. at 135. 
 61. See id. at 135.  Coal’s cost per mmBtu in 1996 was $1.29, and was as low as 
$1.20 per mmBtu in 2000—representing an increase of about 32% since the mid-1990s, 
and 42% since the millennial turn.  See id. 
 62. Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 174.  Using 2005 dollars, this 
outcome assumes a higher than anticipated economic growth—the reference case would 
actually place the price $0.01 per mmBtu lower than at present. See id. 
 63. Richard Bonskowski & William D. Watson, Energy Info. Admin., Coal 
Production in the United States—An Historical Overview 1 (Oct. 2006), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/coal_production_review.pdf. 
 64. Cf. id. (“The 1973 Oil Embargo renewed interest in the vast U.S. coal reserves, 
as the nation strived to achieve energy independence.”) (emphasis added). 
 65. See John Carlin, Energy Info. Admin., Environmental Externalities in Electric 
Power Markets: Acid Rain, Urban Ozone, and Climate Change xi (1995), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/pubs_html/rea/feature1.html; see also Schneider, supra 
note 1 (highlighting the impact of pollution on health and mortality). 
 66. Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14. 
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wreak havoc on human and natural habitats alike by causing things like 
acid rain, urban ozone (caused primarily by nitrous oxide emissions, 
resulting in respiratory problems in humans), and global climate 
change.67  Among fuels used for electricity generation, coal is by far the 
largest producer of these emissions, producing far beyond its 
proportional market share.68  While coal-based power is seen to be the 
least expensive source of electricity on the market today,69 the market 
dynamics that favor coal are substantially flawed.70
The indirect costs associated with the production of electricity from 
coal are simply staggering.71  During the mining stage land is 
permanently damaged, air and water sources are contaminated, ground 
subsidence causes surface collapses, and workers can be injured or 
killed.72  During processing and utilization, heavy metal and acid is 
given off, and particulate matter, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and 
nitrogen oxides are emitted into the atmosphere, causing seemingly 
immeasurable damage and destruction to public and private property, 
wildlife, and public health.73
Every year, the more than 600 coal-burning plants in the United 
States74 emit more than 98,000 pounds of mercury into the air75 while 
creating another 81,000 pounds of mercury pollution from fly ash and 
scrubber sludge76, all after 20,000 pounds of mercury is released in pre-
burning “cleaning” procedures—totaling 200,000 pounds.77  That 
mercury, along with arsenic, cadmium, and other heavy metals, seeps 
out during the coal-burning process and travels either directly through 
ground water and airborne particles, or indirectly through the food chain 
 67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (IPCC); Carlin, supra note 65. 
 68. See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review 2005, DOE/EIA-0384, at 
350-52 (July 2006) [hereinafter Annual Energy Review 2005]. 
 69. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135. 
 70. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 4 (“[I]f the market price of coal or 
energy or both does not capture the social costs of coal use, individual coal users face 
incentives that suggest more consumption than society desires relative to alternative 
sources of energy.”). 
 71. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 12-15 (revealing the mortality rates for a 
number of states and linking heart attacks and lung cancer to pollution). 
 72. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 14. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Coal Takes Heavy Human Toll, USA Today Magazine, Oct. 16, 2004. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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(often through fish), to humans.78  Mercury, even in small doses, is 
converted easily through human metabolism into the neurotoxin 
methylmercury.79  The result of the contamination is that one out of 
every six women of childbearing age may have enough of a 
concentration of mercury to permanently damage a developing fetus, 
meaning 630,000 babies a year born in the United States (out of 4 
million) are at risk for severe neurological consequences as a result of 
gestational mercury poisoning.80  Coal also causes nearly 554,000 
asthma attacks, 16,200 cases of chronic bronchitis, and 38,200 non-fatal 
heart attacks each year.81  Not surprisingly, proximity to coal-burning 
facilities increases the likelihood that a person becomes one of the 
23,600 deaths every year attributed to power plant pollution,82 each 
death taking an average of fourteen years off normal life expectancy.83  
All told, the health care costs caused by plant emissions total an 
estimated $160 billion annually. 84  Other grisly consequences from 
living near coal burning include a high rate of stomach cancer,85 autism 
in children (for every 1,000 pounds of mercury released in a Texas 
county, autism rates rose 17%),86 and pneumoconiosis in coal miners 
(also known as “black lung disease”).87
Environmentally, the externality costs of air pollution, acid rain, 
and global warming are also significant.88  For instance, according to 
one set of estimates, the “annual marginal cost of air pollution and acid 
deposition” is between $10.39 and $11.02 per short ton of coal; for 
climate change, the marginal cost is between $0 and $4.50 per million 
 78. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 16. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Gene Weinberg et al., A Case-Control Study of Stomach Cancer in a Coal 
Mining Region of Pennsylvania, 56 Cancer 703, 703 (1985). 
 86. See Steve Brown, Study Links Power Plant Mercury Emissions to Autism, 
Education Daily, Mar., 24, 2005, at 3. 
 87. See Xiaorong Wang et al., Respiratory Symptoms and Pulmonary Function in 
Coal Miners: Looking Into the Effects of Simple Pneumoconiosis, 35 Am. J. Indus. 
Med. 124, 124 (1999). 
 88. See IPCC Report, supra note 15, at ch. 5 (pp. 235-343); Reeves, supra note 32, 
at 15-17; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 4-7. 
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Btu.89  Absent any consideration of climate change, the approximate 
“social costs of coal as a percentage of private costs range from about 
40% to 275%.”90  The range for natural gas is 12% to 95%, 112% to 
123% for petroleum, and 14% to 17% for nuclear. 91  Another set of 
estimates emphasizes that “coal is by far the most under-priced energy 
resource,”92 and that at a price of $30 per ton would carry with it 
external costs of almost $160 without including climate change risks 
which would bring costs to $190 per ton.93  While monetizing the total 
social and environmental costs to society of fossil fuel use is an inexact 
science, the causal link between polluting fuels and resulting 
externalities is undeniable.94
Despite arguments and economic models that show wide-ranging 
and heavy social costs to fossil fuel burning, and in particular coal 
consumption, unless and until the industries themselves are compelled to 
account for these costs, investment will remain high in traditional energy 
sources.95  Alternatives, still too underdeveloped as a whole to compete 
with the infrastructure96 and reliability of fossil fuels,97 will need time 
 89. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 8 (citing Darwin C. Hall, Preliminary 
Estimates of Cumulative Private and External Costs of Energy, Contemporary Policy 
Issues Vol. VIII, No. 3, 283-307 (July1990)). 
 90. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 9. 
 91. Id. (noting that these figures are “rough estimates”). 
 92. Id. at 10 (citing W. Kip Viscusi et al., Environmentally Responsible Energy 
Pricing,15 ENERGY J. 23 (April 1994). 
 93. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 10. 
 94. See Schneider supra note 1, at 12-25. 
 95. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 6 (“By altering the underlying 
incentive of prices with subsidies or taxes, relative prices can reflect society’s tradeoffs 
and households and firms will voluntarily act according to society’s best interest.”); 
Sawin, supra note 22, at 22 (“In most cases, it is less a matter of finding new money to 
invest in renewable energy, and more a matter of transferring money flows from 
conventional energy to renewables.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 32, at 18 (explaining how wind power producers 
“face significant challenges” because of the “transmission infrastructure and related 
regulatory frameworks” that are in place were designed to meet the needs of traditional 
energy sources, and in part because “wind is a relatively new entrant to the electricity 
generation market”); see also Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-1 to A-10 (evaluating the 
particular concerns facing various renewable energy sources). 
 97. See Bonskowski & Watson, supra note 63.  As the demand for electricity has 
grown, coal production has risen to meet it.  Id. at 2.  Productivity has increased on 
average 4% every year since 1973.  Id. at 7; cf. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 
38, at 9 (noting that all sources of energy derive from nature and thus “vary in their 
availability,” but fossil fuels have “nature cycles of regeneration which . . . occur on a 
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and money to make up the difference.98  With technological advances in 
turbine design reducing the levelized cost of output,99 and not reliant on 
fossil fuel burning like biomass power,100 wind energy has the best 
chance of all truly clean energy sources to make the most immediate and 
long-lasting impact on the electricity market.101
II. A GUST OF ELECTRICITY: HOW WIND POWER IS TAKING OVER THE 
WORLD AS AN INCREASINGLY VIABLE INVESTMENT OPTION AND AN 
ENERGY SOURCE 
With rising externality costs and significant health and 
environmental consequences looming,102 forty-nine states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico have implemented some form of incentive 
for the production (supply-side) or consumption (demand-side) of 
electricity from renewable energy sources.103  Of those forty-nine states, 
forty-six include incentives for wind energy,104 the fastest growing 
renewable electricity generation source in the world.105  State wind 
incentives, as for other renewables, integrate supply-side and demand-
side principles into a combination of both production and consumption 
tax credits, grants, loans, production incentive payments, and sale and 
use standards.106  State action that comprehensively addresses energy 
timescale several orders of magnitude longer” than renewables like wind, and 
photovoltaic power). 
 98. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 26-27. 
 99. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 3-4. 
 100. Cf. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7 (explaining biomass electricity generation 
strategies that would lower production costs including “cofiring biomass in existing 
coal-fired power plants” and “using high-efficiency gasification with combined cycle 
gas turbines”); Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio Standard 2 
(May 2003) [hereinafter Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio] (factoring into its 
examination of a federal renewable portfolio standard a 1.0 cents per kilowatt-hour 
production tax credit for biomass cofiring with existing coal plants). 
 101. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7; Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, 
supra note 114, at 4 (finding that a renewable portfolio standard would lead to greater 
generation from wind and biomass resources). 
 102. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 6-12, 14 (listing the “direct and 
external costs” that coal-based energy levies on society). 
 103. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Reeves, supra note 32, at 9. 
 106. See generally L. Bird et al., Policies and Market Factors Driving Wind Power 
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distribution and consumption contributes to localized success in 
encouraging the construction of wind power production facilities 
(usually called “wind farms”) in nearly every region of the country. 107  
In fact, because the wind-power industry has proven uniquely responsive 
to government action,108 this Note will treat wind power as the bell-
weather for assessing the relative effectiveness of renewable energy 
legislation.  The commercial promise, potential proliferation, and likely 
contribution to national energy needs that wind power represents109 
requires that it be given special attention in the review of renewable 
energy policy in general.110
In February 2006, President George W. Bush voiced his ambition 
that fully 20% of the nation’s electricity could come from wind,111 
mirroring results in Europe where wind accounts for a 10% to 25% 
electricity market share in Denmark, Germany, and areas of Spain.112  
By late 2006, installed wind-based electricity generating capacity in the 
United States exceeded 10,000 megawatts.113  Up from a 2,000 
megawatt capacity in 1999, wind is the fastest growing renewable 
energy source in the world, and is second to only natural gas in newly-
Development in the United States, NREL/TP-620-34599, at 1 (July 2003) [hereinafter 
L. Bird et al.] (discussing the “drivers for wind development in a dozen leading states”). 
 107. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (listing the policies by state); Am. Wind 
Energy Ass’n’s Wind Project Data Base, http://www.awea.org/projects (for a table of 
installed wind energy capacity).  While the Southeast—excluding Tennessee—does not 
have wind energy generation facilities, other renewables benefit from local incentive 
policies on the state and retailer level.  See DSIRE Website, supra note 20. 
 108. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra  note 32, at 8 (Figure 2 illustrates 
the growth of wind capacity in the U.S. relative to the implementation of certain 
government policies between 1980 and 2003); see also NREL Policies and Market 
Factors, supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Energy Markets Continue to 
Boom – 2006 Another Record Year, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://awea.org/ 
newsroom/pdf/070202__GWEC_Global_Market_Annual_Statistics.pdf [hereinafter 
Global Wind Energy Council]. 
 110. See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 17. 
 111. See Emerging U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention, Env’t News Serv., 
Feb. 22, 2006, available at www.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2006/2006-02-22-02.asp 
[hereinafter U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention] 
 112. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy Basics, Feb. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pdf/Wind_Energy_Basics.pdf [hereinafter Wind 
Energy Basics]. 
 113. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, U.S. Wind Energy Installations Reach New 
Milestone, Aug. 14, 2006. 
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installed generating capacity in the United States, as of 2005.114  
Worldwide, wind energy capacity grew 15,197 megawatts in 2006 
alone,115 accounting for nearly 75,000 megawatts total.116  Furthermore, 
busbar costs have dropped from $0.38 per kilowatt hour since 
government support for wind power began in the early 1980s, to 
between $0.02 and $0.06 per kilowatt hour now.117
One megawatt hour of electricity on average in the United States 
produces emissions of 1,341 pounds of carbon dioxide,118 7.5 pounds of 
sulfur dioxide,119 and 3.55 pounds of nitrogen oxides.120  If wind-
generated electricity totaled 10 million megawatt hours per year, or 
roughly the generation totals at 2002 capacity levels,121 it would avoid 
emissions of 6.7 million tons of carbon dioxide,122 37,500 tons of sulfur 
dioxide123 (which when combined with atmospheric water vapor 
becomes sulfuric acid, the primary component of acid rain), and 17,750 
tons of nitrogen oxides.124  The more wind energy that is produced in a 
geographic region, the more effect it will have on displacing toxic 
emissions.125
The American wind energy market is projected by its industry trade 
association, the American Wind Energy Association (the “AWEA”), to 
be able to support 10,000 megawatts of wind power installations every 
year. This in turn would make the goal of producing 20% of the nation’s 
electrical supply achievable.126  Considering its growth, the wind 
industry is still remarkably sensitive to legislative action.127  In fact, 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Wind Energy Basics, supra note 112. 
 116. See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109. 
 117. Reeves, supra note 32, at 9. 
 118. Id. at 15. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 99. 
 122. Reeves, supra note 32, at 15. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id.  Furthermore, “[w]ind has the potential to displace relatively more 
emissions in areas where more heavily polluting fuels predominate.”  Id. 
 126. Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 1. 
 127. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 36-39 for an overview of how a variety of 
government policies can have a “sizeable effect on the wind industry,” especially when 
transmission access is less discriminatory. 
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nearly all of the industry’s major challenges are addressable through 
regulatory initiative and tax policy.128  The wind power industry has 
shown responsiveness to virtually every type of supply and demand-side 
incentive policy on the books, including each of the following: 
installation credits, net metering, system benefits funds, sales and 
property tax exemptions, grants, loans, production tax credits and 
incentives, and renewable portfolio standards.129  For example, in 2003 
the EIA released a study in which they examined the possible effects of 
a 10% national renewable portfolio standard by 2030130—a lower 
percentage and later date than most states currently employing a 
renewable portfolio standard.131  Wind energy, the study suggested, 
would be the greatest beneficiary of such action, while fossil fuels coal 
and natural gas would be most negatively influenced in terms of 
production, albeit not heavily.132  The price of electricity at end-use 
sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, transportation), the EIA 
found, would largely remain unaffected.133
Furthermore, in addition to legislative incentives and market-
adjustment policies, government investment into research and 
development has allowed the wind industry to help itself as well.134  The 
amount of electricity that can be harvested from wind power is a 
function of the mass of the moving air and its velocity.135  Therefore 
improvements in the turbine (which includes a rotor, gearbox, 
 128. See id. at 35-36 (finding that wind power development is promoted most 
strongly by state tax and financial incentives, including renewable portfolio standards, 
and technological improvements “facilitated by federal tax incentives,” but stating that 
transmission costs brought about by regulatory “uncertainties” negatively affect 
industry growth). 
 129. See L. Bird et al., supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Am. Wind 
Energy Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions About Net Metering, available at 
http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/netmetfin_fs.pdf (outlining some of the benefits net 
metering can provide in a small-scale residential wind facility). 
 130. Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100. 
 131. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20, available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/RPS_Map.ppt. 
 132. See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 4, 17-18. 
 133. See id. at 4. 
 134. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4 (arguing that 40% of the reduction 
in costs for wind power is a result of technological improvements, with government 
polices that encourage economies of scale accounting for most of the rest); see also 
Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 646 (Figure 5), 655-56. 
 135. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 5. 
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monitoring equipment, and a tower)136 have a direct effect on a wind 
power facility’s output.137  For example, in 1981, a standard turbine’s 
rotor was 10 meters in diameter with a rated capacity of 25 kilowatts.138  
By 2000, standard rotor diameter measures 71 meters in diameter with a 
capacity of 1,650 kilowatts.139  Innovations like larger, better designed 
turbines, situated in larger wind farms substantially reduce the cost of 
production per kilowatt hour in large part because they are more 
efficient to manage and operate.140  As turbine capacity increases, 
energy production costs go down141 and investment goes up.142  
Continued technological improvements, like those that support lower 
wind speed turbine output,143 will further support the wind market,144 
and provide power without the risk of rising fuel costs.145
 136. Id. at 8-9. 
 137. Id. at 5: 
The energy content of a particular volume of wind is proportional to the square of its 
velocity.  Thus, a doubling of the speed with which this volume of air passes through 
a wind turbine will result in roughly a fourfold increase in power that can be extracted 
from this air.  In addition, this doubling of wind speed will allow twice the volume of 
air to pass through the turbine in a given amount of time, resulting in an eightfold 
increase in power generated.  This means that only a slight increase in wind velocity 
can yield significant gains in power production. 
Id. 
 138. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, The Economics of Wind Energy, Feb. 2005, available 
at http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/EconomicsOfWind-Feb2005.pdf. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id.; Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4. 
 141. Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4. 
 142. See, e.g., Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, News Release, Wind Energy Capacity in 
U.S. Increased 27% in 2006 and is Expected to Grow an Additional 26% in 2007, Jan. 
23, 2007, available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/Wind_Power_ 
Capacity_012307.html [hereinafter Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News 
Release] (citing the $4 billion aggregate investment used to install the nearly 2,500 
megawatts of wind power in the United States in 2006); cf. Sawin, supra note 22, at 18 
(explaining that financial incentives for renewable power industries reduce the cost of 
production by subsidizing investment in new technology or in the production of the 
energy itself; accordingly, increased investment is a function of lower costs for more 
efficient production). 
 143. See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 
Wind and Hydropower Technologies Program: Low Wind Speed Technology, available 
at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind_low_speed.html. 
 144. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4-6. 
 145. See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 2. 
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A. Wind Investment: Blowing Money Is a Becoming a Better Bet 
Despite optimistic projections146 and technological improvements 
to the turbines that actually generate the electricity,147 both the AWEA 
and the President recognize that the long-term health of the industry lies 
in private investment.148  Between 1995 and 2005, private investment in 
renewables totaled roughly $180 billion, including $39 billion in 2005, 
six times higher than ten years earlier.149  Despite this growth, and the 
fact that wind installations are going up faster than nuclear power plants 
worldwide,150 the structure of project ownership is crucial.151  The 
AWEA notes that because of the capital-intensive nature of wind energy 
and the cheaper financing options available to utility-owned energy 
projects, it is still more expensive to produce a kilowatt hour as a private 
power producer than as a utility.152  Deregulation of the electric power 
sector and the rise of IOUs (investor-owned utilities) provide a safer, 
potentially more lucrative option for investment.153  IOU ownership, 
according to a 1996 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study cited 
by the AWEA, reduced the levelized costs of power production by as 
much as 30%.154  While product novelty may benefit certain industries 
 
 146. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News Release, supra note 142. 
 147. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4. 
 148. See George W. Bush, “President Discusses Advanced Energy initiative In 
Milwaukee,” Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 20, 2006, available at, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/print/20060220-1.html [hereinafter 
Bush Speech Feb. 2006] (arguing that to “encourage conservation and new technologies 
and alternative sources of energy,” the government—which provides one-third of 
research and development dollars as opposed to two-thirds from the private sector—
needs to “make sure people [and private businesses] continue to invest”); see also Am. 
Wind Energy Ass’n, Investing in Wind Power, available at 
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/InvestingInWindPowerFS2005.pdf (illustrating 
the options open to private investors who are interested in putting money into the wind 
power industry). 
 149. See Worldwatch Institute & Center for American Progress, American Energy: 
A Renewable Path to Energy Security, at 12, Sept. 2006, available at, 
http://www.nfu.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/AmericanEnergyReport.pdf. 
 150. Id. at 11. 
 151. See AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Wisner & Kahn, supra note 33, at 19-31. 
 154. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Comparative Cost of Wind and Other Energy 
Sources.  According to the AWEA, “[l]evelized costing calculates in current dollars all 
capital, fuel, and operating and maintenance costs associated with the plant over its 
lifetime and divides that total cost by the estimated output in [kilowatt hours] over the 
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with regard to financing, wind power producers do not enjoy this 
advantage.  In fact, it is the opposite.155  The AWEA notes that “lenders 
therefore offer less favorable financing terms and demand a higher 
return on investment than for more “conventional” energy sources.”156  
Higher interest rates on capital investment, if reduced to the same level 
as natural gas plants, would reduce wind energy production costs 
approximately 40%.157
Nonetheless, as wind energy grows in market share158—and the 
European example offers support for such an eventuality159—novelty 
wears off.  From the time of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
study, wind power generation has grown exponentially.160  In 1996, at 
the study’s publication, installed capacity in the United States was 
roughly 1,700 megawatts, having languished through relatively slow 
growth through most of the mid-1990s.161  Today output is far greater,162 
and industry advocates expect the economics of today’s wind industry to 
attract new capital.163  Supply-side legislation notwithstanding, potential 
investors, however, need to be convinced of the long-term marketability 
of the product.164
 
lifetime of the plant.”  Id. at n.1; see also AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138 
(referencing the same study’s findings in February 2005). 
 155. AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138. 
 156. See id. (citing Wisner & Kahn, supra note 33, at 11). 
 157. See id. (finding that “a 50-[megawatt] wind farm delivering power at just under 
5 cents per [kilowatt hour] would, if using typical natural gas financing terms, generate 
electricity for 3.69 cents per [kilowatt hour]”). 
 158. See infra notes 165-206. 
 159. See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109; Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, 
Global Wind Energy Market Report, March 2004 at 2-4. 
 160. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Power: U.S. Installed Capacity: 1981-
2006, available at, http://www.awea.org/faq/instcap.html. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News Release, supra note 142. 
 164. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 6 (explaining how a lack of familiarity 
with renewable technologies, coupled with premiums on acquiring investment capital—
among other barriers—result from uncertainty about future technology performance and 
a generalized lack of information). 
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B. “Demanding” Wind Power: A Market Analysis 
To evaluate the existence of a market and its relative strength and 
trajectory, in this case the wind power market, often observers point to 
the relative cost of producing a unit of electricity from one source versus 
other sources.165  The federal government’s policy for promoting 
renewable energy relies on supply-oriented tax credits and production 
incentives in an effort to stimulate the construction of electricity-
generating facilities and the sale and distribution of renewable power.166  
State policy involves more of a mix between production incentive 
strategies and schemes that create markets for renewables (demand-
side).167  This Note proposes that it is most accurate to determine the 
existence of a power source’s market potential not by examining supply 
as manifested in price, but another fundamental economic concept—
demand as expressed in consumption. 
There are essentially two distinct, but related markets at work that 
need to be recognized when reviewing electric power sector data.  The 
first is the producer-distributor market, and the second is the distributor-
end-user market.168  Government, in enacting tax credits and research 
 
 165. See Burnett, supra note 54 (arguing that there is no natural market for wind 
power because government subsidies artificially lower cost); see also Cherry & 
Shogren, supra note 29 (asserting that the fossil fuel prevalence is a result of a market 
failure which keep costs artificially low because externalities relating to health and 
environmental damage caused by certain kinds of electricity production are not factored 
into utility charges); but see Reeves, supra note 32, at 11.  The author explains that “the 
comparison of the cost of wind generation to other types of generation is often 
controversial.” The controversy appears to stem from the subjective manner in which 
variables like project financing or social costs are factored into these cost comparisons.  
See id.  For the purposes of this market analysis, social cost concerns are not imputed to 
either policy-makers or investors.  See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5 (stating 
that “investors rarely include [environmental externalities] in the bottom line used to 
make decisions”). 
 166. See U.S. House Comm. on Energy & Com. Press Off., “Energy Policy Act of 
2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” April 2005 (stating that promoting 
production of renewable-sourced electricity was the purpose for renewing incentives in 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, discussed infra); see also L. Bird et al., supra note 106, 
at 4-5 (providing an overview of “federal tax and financial incentives” that “encouraged 
wind power development”) (emphasis added). 
 167. See, e.g.,  L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 6-35 (providing examples of state-
level policies). 
 168. See J.E. Pater, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical Report, A 
Framework for Evaluating the Total Value Proposition of Clean Energy Technologies, 
NREL/TP-620-38597, at 6, Feb. 2006 (illustrating graphically the “value chains” which 
2007 RESHAPING ENERGY INVESTMENT AND 1031 
 REDUCING FOSSIL FUEL EXTERNALITIES 
 
and development grants to fund technological improvement, seeks to 
provide renewables a chance to compete with fossil fuels for access to 
consumers by reducing production cost.169 Market-creation policies like 
a renewable portfolio standard affect the market primarily by mandating 
that a specified threshold of electricity sales (often a percentage) come 
from a particular class of energy source.170  Electricity consumption is 
the output of this cascading market system.171  Price is thus the 
economic medium through which legislative ends are met, but is not a 
policy end unto itself.172  Therefore, even though the legislation might 
be aimed directly at driving down the cost of production to the power 
exist in the electricity generation markets).  In many circumstances, the entity that is the 
distributor or transmitter of electricity is the same as the power generator (normally a 
utility).  See Energy Info. Admin., The Changing Structure of the Electric Power 
Industry 2000: An Update, DOE/EIA-0562(00), at 16-17, 19-20, 22-24, 27-28 (2000), 
available at, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf 
[hereinafter Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry] (outlining the roles of 
the actors in the electricity supply market).  In that situation, the market (as measured 
by consumption) expresses itself in the energy sources the electricity retailer (utility or 
non-utility) chooses to use to generate the power it sells to its end-use customers.  See 
Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry, supra at 23-24 (discussing the 
wholesale electricity market).  For wind and geothermal energy, independent power 
producers, which are “non-utilities,” generate most of the electricity that is “consumed” 
(purchased) by the distributor-utilities from these sources.  See Changing Structure of 
the Electric Power Industry, supra at 24; Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy 
Trends 2004, at 13, Aug. 2005. 
 169. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8 (stating, for 
instance, that (1) “The United States has [used] financial incentives to try to spur the 
growth of renewable energy,” and (2) research and development investments by the 
government are “intended to accelerate the development and introduction of 
technologies and practices that provide social benefits, such as increased energy 
security, reduced energy costs, or reduced pollution associated with energy 
use . . . because, when successful R&D reduces the capital and/or operating costs of 
new products or processes”); see also NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 32. 
 170. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 8-9. 
 171. See Pater, supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Monthly Energy 
Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 5, 143.  The EIA measures geothermal, wind, and 
photovoltaic electricity consumption by its net generation and employs a formula to 
estimate the equivalent fossil fuel burning it would take to replace the generation from 
those sources.  Id. 
 172. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 16.  “As wholesale electricity becomes 
more of a competitive market commodity, price becomes relatively more important than 
other factors in determining a buyer’s choice of electricity supplier.”  Id. 
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producer (e.g. a wind farm owner),173 whether it creates or boosts a 
market is not ascertained by looking at price per se, but in measuring 
consumption and demand—the amount of energy from that source that 
is actually used (producer-distributors) or purchased (distributors-end 
users).174
The double market means that demand can be measured in two 
ways.  In the electric power sector, consumption is measured by the 
amount of power that production and distribution facilities (e.g. utility-
scale power plants) use to sell to their customers.175  This is, however, 
somewhat confusing, because consumption statistics for certain 
renewables, including wind, are measured by approximate thermal 
conversion rates (measured in Btu), which are derived from the energy 
source’s net generation (measured in kilowatt-hours).176  This means that 
figures measuring the consumption of wind energy (along with solar and 
geothermal) are actually based on a formula of what a utility would have 
to consume from a fossil fuel source to generate the same electricity.177  
Therefore, in evaluating demand, either the thermal conversion 
equivalent of what the electric retailer consumes (in Btu) or the 
electricity bought by the end-user from a retailer (in kilowatt-hours) can 
be considered a result of governmental cost-reduction incentives. 
The change in the wind power industry’s market share is observable 
though its percentage-share of total consumption in the electric power 
sector.  That change can be traced to the economic impact of 
governmental policy choices.178  Owing to the fact that supply is a 
 173. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 10. 
 174. Cf. Pater, supra note 168, at vi, 6 (depicting the flow of value in renewable-
source electricity generation markets to illustrate how an input like a tax credit or 
subsidy at one point in the “value chain” can manifest at the end). 
 175. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 36-37.  Given the 
58.6 trillion Btu of electricity the United States imported on average between 2001 and 
2006, it is clear that electricity producing and distributing facilities would not generate, 
or take in power they did not intend to sell.  Accordingly, this Note imputes 
consumption data for the electric power sector to end-use consumers of electricity.  This 
is reflected by the EIA’s use of “net generation” statistics for certain renewables in their 
consumption data.  See id. at 9, 35. 
 176. See id. at 164 (listing the approximate heat conversion rates for fossil fuel 
plants that apply to wind power and other sources, which generated 10,022 Btu per 
kilowatt-hour in 2006). 
 177. Id. at 164, 168. 
 178. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 7-8 (asserting that the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 which implemented the first production tax credit and 
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function of a direct relationship between price and quantity, if the supply 
curve in the producer-distributor market has been out-shifted because of 
tax credits and technology subsidies, production costs would be lower 
and the wind power at distributor’s disposal would correspondingly be 
higher. 179 Similarly, market-creation policies like renewable portfolio 
standards directly out-shift the demand curve by mandating 
consumption.180  Therefore, if the policies have any effect, demand and 
consumption should be higher ex post.  This Note, in keying in on 
demand, posits that logically, the effectiveness of legislative policy 
choices and thus, the level of investment potential, can be evaluated by 
whether consumption numbers for wind energy (or any industry) are 
rising at a faster rate than its peers.  If wind energy consumption rates 
are increasing at a faster rate over time relative to total electric power 
consumption, they must be gaining a greater market share.  Declining 
consumption rates, or slower increases, for any other energy source 
would circumstantially reinforce that conclusion. 
There is no reason to suggest that the idiosyncratic desire to 
purchase wind energy is a superseding intervening cause for these 
results.  While many utilities offer green pricing programs that allow 
end-use purchasers to choose to consume electricity from renewable 
sources, they accounted for only 0.2% of total U.S. electricity sales in 
2005 and only about 3% of wind power consumption for that year.181  
By and large this signifies that end-users buy the default energy their 
utility offers, reflecting the utility’s choice and costs regarding a power 
source.  Moreover, since nearly all of the electricity consumed by end-
renewable energy production incentive “significantly improved the economics of wind 
power,” as illustrated by the growing U.S. installed wind capacity with each renewal of 
the credit). 
 179. Cf. Reeves, supra note 32, at 22-23. 
 180. See N.H. van der Linden et al., Energy Research Center of the Netherlands 
(ECN), Review of International Experience With Renewable Energy Obligation Support 
Mechanisms 10 (ECN-C–05-025, May 2005). 
 181. See Bird & Swezey, supra note 21, at 4 (citing figures from Energy 
Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 2005, at 46, (Nov. 2006)).  It is 
worth mentioning that of the 8.5 billion kilowatt hours in retail sales of electricity 
attributed to voluntary purchase markets, 61% of the green power sales came from wind 
energy.  Id. at 26.  Using the 2005 heat rate conversion factor (999 Btu per kilowatt-
hour), that 61% would translate to 5.185 million kilowatt-hours which in turn comes out 
to about 5.19 trillion Btu (2.92% of the 178 trillion Btu total for wind power in 2005).  
See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35, 164. 
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use sectors comes from the electric power sector, 182  that sector’s 
consumption data is an accurate reflection of wind power’s electricity 
demand market share. 
The electric power sector consumption numbers bear out the fact 
that wind power, though still a minor factor in terms of overall market 
share, grew considerably faster than the electric power sector as a whole 
since its statistics were first accurately recorded.183  Total electric power 
sector energy consumption (all consumption figures for this section in 
trillion Btu) in 2006 was 29.4% higher than it was in 1990.184  That 
29.4% increase is the standard by which this Note evaluates the relative 
growth, decline, or stagnation of selected energy sources.  Coal 
consumption in the electric power sector was 26.2% higher in 2006 than 
it was in 1990,185 maintaining a slightly declining majority share of the 
market during that period.186  Natural gas consumption, which is nearly 
wholly reliant on the electric power sector,187 was 92.7% higher.188  
 182. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 100 (listing Electric 
Power Sector statistics), accord id., at 113 (listing Electricity End Use statistics) 
(showing how roughly 94% of retail electric power sector net generation is reported as 
sold to end-use sectors).  Losses occur mainly during transmission and distribution and 
as a result of the direct use of generated electricity at “adjacent or co-located facilities.” 
See Annual Energy Review 2005, supra note 68, at 224. 
 183. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.  The data for 
wind power consumption did not include independent power producers until 1989.  This 
analysis begins in 1990, and includes the ascertainable consumption rates during the 
two years prior to the implementation of the first production tax credit, years in which 
consumption was relatively stagnant.  It also includes slow growth periods between 
2001 and 2005 attributable to periods in which the tax credit lapsed or was threatened to 
lapse.  Id. 
 184. Id. at 35 (increasing from 30,684 trillion Btu in 1990 to 39,710 trillion Btu in 
2006).  The percentages have been rounded. 
 185. Id. at 35 (increasing from 16,261 trillion Btu to 20,517 trillion Btu). 
 186. Id. (53.0% in 1990, 51.7% in 2006).  The electric power sector’s dependency 
on coal however is mutual, as about 91% of coal’s power production in 2006 is 
accounted for by this sector.  See id. at 7, 35 (percentage totals rounded to nearest 
tenth). 
 187. See id. at 7, 35.  The electric power sector does not account for nearly the same 
percentage of total natural gas-produced energy consumption as coal does (only 28.5% 
compared with 91.0% for coal).  See id.  Still, while the gross consumption of energy 
from natural gas for all sectors was 14.0% more in 2006 than it was in 1990 (19,730 
trillion Btu to 22,495 trillion Btu) its 2006 use in the electric power sector was higher 
than in 1990 by 92.7% (3,332 trillion Btu to 6,421 trillion Btu).  See id. (stating that 
energy consumption from natural gas in all sectors in 2006 surpassed 1990 totals by 
2,765 trillion Btu); see id. at 7.  The 3,089 trillion Btu difference between 1990 and 
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Petroleum, the weakest of the fossil fuels in electricity production,189 fell 
49.9% in electric power sector consumption from its 1990 totals,190 
while nuclear power, neither a fossil fuel nor renewable, was 33.2% 
higher.191  Electricity production represents the major use of renewable 
energy generally,192 and the only use for wind,193 whose market share in 
the electric power sector was slightly less than 0.1% in 1990, or 29 
trillion Btu.194  In terms of vindicating government policy, however, 
1990 was a proper departure point.  Iowa passed the first renewable 
portfolio standard in 1991,195 and the first federal production tax credit 
was passed in 1992.196  In 1997, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Nevada 
2006 in the electric power sector alone means that 111.7% of the growth in all sectors is 
accounted for in electricity production.  Thus, natural gas’s consumption market share 
for all sectors decreased from 23.3% in 1990 to 22.6% in 2006 (-0.7%)).  See id. 
 188. See id. at 35 (documenting an increase from 3,332 trillion Btu to 6,421 trillion 
Btu, which effectively moved a 10.9% electric power sector market share in 1990 to 
16.2% in 2006). 
 189. See id. at 35 (documenting a 4.2% market share in 1990 and a 1.6% market 
share in 2006). 
 190. See id. (documenting 1,289 trillion Btu in 1990; 646 trillion Btu in 2006).  It is 
worth noting that petroleum is by far the most consumed source of energy in the 
country at 40.4% for all sectors – the bulk of its use being in the transportation sector 
(68.9%).  See id. at 7, 33. 
 191. See id. at 35 (accounting for a 19.8% market share in 1990 and a 20.7% market 
share in 2006). 
 192. See id. at 143, 146.  In 2006, the equivalent of 6,523 trillion Btu was consumed 
from renewable sources of energy in all sectors.  Id. at 143.  Of the total, 3,857 trillion 
Btu was consumed by the electric power sector, good for 59.1%.  Id. at 146.  While 
most sources of renewable energy are a product of the electric power sector in terms of 
total renewables energy consumption, biomass is an exception since only 14.3% is 
consumed in the production of electricity.  See id. at 143, 146.  Solar, though a mainstay 
of renewable energy discussions, contributes to less than 1% of renewable consumption, 
but most of that goes to the residential sector (92.2%), with the remaining 7.8% used in 
electricity production.  See id. at 143, 144.  Of the other major renewable energy 
sources (comprising 53.6% of the total), the electric power sector represents the 
following percentage of their total consumption in all sectors: hydro: 98.9%; 
geothermal: 90.2%; wind: 100%.  See id. at 143, 146. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. at 35. 
 195. See Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, Pew Center on Global Climate Change 3-4 (June 
2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/ 
race_to_the_top/index.cfm. 
 196. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (1992) (amended 2006). 
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passed production standards as well.197  From 1999 to 2005, eighteen 
more states including Texas, California and New York, as well as the 
District of Columbia, followed suit.198  Although wind power 
consumption only once actually decreased between any two years,199 
hiccups in the acceleration of wind power’s growth are widely attributed 
to the lapses of the production tax credit.200  The credit was renewed in 
2005,201 and has not lapsed since.202  By 2006, though wind power’s 
market share was still only 0.65%, it had grown in consumption from 29 
trillion Btu to 258 trillion Btu, an increase of about 790%.203  Between 
1990 and 2006, electric power sector consumption, if wind were not 
included, averaged an annual increase of slightly less than 1.7%.204  
Wind power consumption on the other hand—with an average annual 
increase of about 46.5%—grew 26-times faster than the rest of the 
field.205  While a 20% market share is not in the picture presently, it is 
clear that wind energy does enjoy a market.  If access to the power grid, 
which is maintained by utilities, is assured for renewable energy 
producers, their input of electricity into the marketplace (both of them) 
would necessarily increase.206
The news for the wind industry is not all good.  Despite recent 
 197. Rabe, supra note 195, at 3. 
 198. Id. at 4. 
 199. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.  The decrease 
was 3 trillion Btu between 1997 and 1998.  Id. 
 200. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 8 fig.2 (charting the 
relationship between wind power’s growth in capacity and the several incarnations of 
the production tax credit); Burnett, supra note 54 (arguing that the wind power industry 
is beholden to the production tax credit, including a reference to the 2003 expiration in 
which the author argues that wind became uncompetitive when the credit last lapsed); 
Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647. 
 201. Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1301 (2005). 
 202. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207 
(2006) (extending the production tax credit to Dec. 31, 2008). 
 203. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See Jim Caldwell, Wind in the Pipeline, Mechanical Engineering Magazine, 
“Power & Energy” ¶ 15 (Mar. 2004), http://www.memagazine.org/supparch/pemar04/ 
pipeline/pipeline.html (arguing that “streamlined interconnection procedures and fair 
transmission access and costs [to generators] would allow wind to have a place in 
interstate commerce as merchant generation”).  The author was the policy director for 
the AWEA when he wrote this article. 
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gains, long-term growth is still questionable.207 For one, the current 
production tax credit is again scheduled to expire (this time on 
December 31, 2008),208 but a tougher obstacle remains—wind power’s 
greatest potential lies in relatively geographically remote regions.209  
Therefore, issues involving transmission costs threaten to put the brakes 
on the industry’s growth.210  The national power grid, as it stands, is not 
conducive to carrying massive amounts of current, for example, from the 
wind-rich prairies of the Dakotas to larger population centers near the 
Great Lakes or the Pacific Northwest.211  As wind energy production 
reaches the maximum competitive utility transmission cost, supply-side 
policies will drive consumption and investment potential upward into a 
veritable glass ceiling.212
III: THE “MORAL EQUIVALENT TO WAR”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY LEGISLATION 
Equating the battlefield with energy policy and the push for clean 
sources of power free from foreign and despotic influences reflects the 
mood of a nation weary of price shocks and embargoes when President 
Jimmy Carter voiced the above analogy on April 18, 1977 during a 
televised speech.213  In fact, modern energy policy in the United States 
can be traced to the oil embargoes and ensuing energy supply crises of 
the 1970s.214 A litany of bills was introduced in the Congress between 
 207. See id. at ¶ 2 (saying that wind energy’s “prospects” were “dimmed . . . by the 
failure to secure a timely extension for the federal wind energy production tax credit” in 
2004). 
 208. H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207 (2006). 
 209. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-4–A-5. 
 210. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 18-19 (outlining the difficulties remote wind 
power producers face in trying to provide their product to consumers). 
 211. See Caldwell Pipeline Article, supra note 206 (explaining that the transmission 
system “across the Missouri River basin or in the interior West” is “brittle” and “leads 
to significant restrictions on regional electricity exports”); see Reeves, supra note 32, at 
18-19. 
 212. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 19 (“When the demand for [access to] a 
transmission path exceeds its reliable capacity, utilities react by limiting generation.”). 
 213. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., The President’s Proposed Energy Policy 
(Apr. 18, 1977), in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLIII, No. 14, May 1, 1977, pp. 
418-20, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/filmmore/ps_energy.html. 
 214. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, History of the 
Committee, No. 100-46 (1989), available at http://energy.senate.gov/about/about_ 
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the Nixon and George H.W. Bush administrations, which sought to 
promote energy efficiency, reduce dependence of foreign energy 
sources, and incentivize their alternatives.215  While most of the 
legislation proposed during this period was aimed at stimulating 
domestic energy production from fossil fuel and nuclear sources, nascent 
renewable sources garnered some attention,216 most notably solar and 
geothermal technologies.217  Over the next three decades, biomass218 and 
wind-based power219 joined solar and geothermal technologies as the 
subject of legislative policies designed to make use of inexhaustible 
power supplies.220  Whether through research and development 
funding,221 market approaches like tax credits and investment 
incentives,222 or renewable energy-based production and use 
standards,223 both the federal and state governments endeavored to fight 
the energy war, often, however, on both sides of the front.224
For the purposes of this Note, the relevant energy legislation of the 
history.html. 
 215. See infra notes 217-28. 
 216. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 645-46. 
 217. See, e.g., Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and 
Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 95-590 (1978); Solar Energy Research Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-473 (1974) (including funding for wind); Geothermal Energy Research, 
Development and Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-410 (1974); Solar Heating and 
Cooling Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-403 (1974). 
 218. See, e.g., Wood Residue Utilization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-554 (1980); 
Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294 (1980) (regarding 
extended loan commitment guarantees through 1985 in Pub. L. No. 99-24 (1985)). 
 219. See, e.g., Solar, Wind, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575 (1990), Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
345 (1980). 
 220. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 661-68 (providing a brief 
overview of relevant renewables legislation between 1974 and 2005). 
 221. E.g., Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-345 (1980). 
 222. E.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). 
 223. See, e.g., DSIRE Website, supra note 20, available at http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
documents/SummaryMaps/RPS_Map.ppt (containing an illustration of state renewable 
portfolio standards). 
 224. See Doug Koplow & John Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel Subsidies and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal 
Policy, 26 Ann. Rev. of Energy and the Env’t 361, at 362-71 (2001); see also Public 
Citizen National Non-Profit Public Interest Organization, The Best Bill Corporations 
Could Buy: A Summary of Industry Giveaways in the 2005 Energy Bill, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/aug2005ebsum.pdf [hereinafter Public Citizen EP 
Act 2005 Analysis] (analyzing the Domenici-Barton Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
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last three decades can most appropriately be deemed ‘domestic 
electricity production policy.’225  Using fiscal policy as its tool, 
legislatures use ostensibly two methods to encourage greater production 
and lower prices, supply-side tax credits and subsidies and demand-side 
purchase, sale, and consumption mandates.226  In order to promote the 
proliferation of renewable energy Congress has preferred to use 
primarily supply-side policies,227 with one notable exception,228 while 
many states tend toward more integrated strategies.229
A. Making Renewables Cheaper and More Lucrative: Supply-Side 
Electricity Production Policy 
In order to affect the supply of a commodity—in this case 
increasing renewable-source electricity production230—legislatures have 
a number of policy options at their disposal.  This Note divides them 
into two categories: capital subsidization and production incentive.231  
 
 225. Petroleum-oriented laws are not discussed at any length. 
 226. See Dr. Keith Kozloff, Hagler Bailly, Inc., Renewable Energy Strategies in 
Developing and EIT Countries Under Restructured Electricity Markets, Presented at 
“Accelerating Grid-Based Renewable Energy Power Generation for a Clean 
Environment,” (Mar. 8, 2000), http://www.usea.org/agbrepgconf2000/pdf/b2b_s_p.pdf 
(providing a breakdown of examples of supply side and demand side methods for 
promoting the growth in renewable power).  To avoid confusion, this Note’s use of the 
term “supply-side” invokes any law that directly impacts the development and/or 
installation of electricity-generating capacity through subsidy, loan, tax credit, 
production incentive, rebate, or grant.  Conversely, the term “demand-side” implicates 
legislation designed to foster a new market or economy of scale that provides producers 
of electricity with purchasers/consumers. 
 227. E.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 (instituting the 
production tax credit and renewable energy production incentive for the first time in the 
amount of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour for the production of electricity from renewable 
sources). 
 228. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117 (1978), discussed infra notes 309-23. 
 229. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Renewable Energy Report supra note 58, at 661-68; see also Policies to 
Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8. 
 231. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12-13.  The author refers to supply-promoting 
policies of this type under the general label “subsidies,” which are divided into “capital 
subsidies” (research and development and/or project financing) and “production” (tax 
credit, incentive payment and rebate).  Low-interest loans, while not a “subsidy” per se, 
see id. at 13, still fit into this Note’s categorization as a supply-side capital subsidization 
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Insofar as they pertain to the goal of stimulating renewable energy 
production (supply), both act by reducing the cost of developing the 
resource for market.232  Thus, these policies directly affect the individual 
commercial actor (e.g. power producer, investor, etc.),233 and indirectly 
promote broader social benefits.234
The capital subsidization tools chosen by American jurisdictions 
typically take the form of grants for research and development (R&D) 
and loan programs.235  In many states, however, rebates and investment 
tax credits act as a substitute for both.236  Each is designed to work in 
tandem with the other—R&D funds improve technology while the loans 
provide start-up capital to encourage the timely implementation of that 
technology.237  Likewise, rebates ensure capital recovery on investment 
and installation of renewable technologies.238  A relevant example of a 
loan scheme was passed by Congress as part of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004,239 which created the “green bonds” program.  In 
allocating up to $2 billion in tax-exempt bond financing, large building 
developers were permitted to obtain low-interest loans, the benefits of 
which are allowed to be spent on renewable energy technologies for 
as they are, in effect, a government-provided discount on project financing. 
 232. Id. at 12 (“Subsidies . . . only affect one side of the development equation: 
profitability.”). 
 233. See id. and accompanying text; see also NREL Value Framework supra note 
168, at 32-33, 40-41 (explaining how in the case of production tax credits, the firm 
generating the power reaps the benefit of the policy, and in research and development 
programs, the funds “may be integrated with a firm’s operations as a generator, 
distributor, or an end user—although this last case is infrequent” (emphasis added)). 
 234. See id.  The graphical representation of the value chain illustrates this principle. 
Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2, at 34-35 (arguing in a 
national security context vis-à-vis China that “diversifying sources and types of 
energy . . . . toward alternative sources can greatly relieve pressures on markets for 
conventional energy sources over time, while helping to cope with growing 
environmental concerns”). 
 235. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (Table of Financial Incentives for 
Renewable Energy), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/financial.cfm 
?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=0&RE=1 for examples of how states and the federal 
government employ capital subsidization policies in the areas of R&D and installation 
loans. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12-13. 
 238. See Pater, supra note 168, at 37-38. 
 239. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 710 (2004). 
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their projects.240  Likewise, a current example of an R&D grant program 
is in Florida, where the state will provide matching funds for projects 
relating to renewable energy technology.241  The purpose is to encourage 
the expense of private capital on renewable energy projects in the state, 
promoting renewable industry while giving Floridians the benefit of a 
decreased need for local fossil fuel emissions.242
Federal research and development funding for renewables grew 
dramatically in the late 1970s, cresting $1.2 billion in the budget for 
1980, before precipitously dropping off over the next decade.243 
Between 1974 and 2002, more than 10% of federal energy funding for 
research and development went to renewables, totaling more than $100 
billion during that time.244  In 1974, R&D initiatives included the Solar 
Energy Research Development and Demonstration Act,245 which first 
provided funds for solar and wind projects, the Geothermal Energy 
Research, Development and Demonstration Act,246 and the Solar 
Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act.247  Wind energy was the 
subject of the Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980,248 which provided 
grant money for research and development into the development of wind 
energy technologies and was supervised by the Department of Energy 
and NASA.249
Current R&D funding is administered primarily through the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”).250  Despite funding 
 240. See Pater, supra note 168, at 33-34. 
 241. FLA. STAT. § 377.801 (2006). 
 242. Press Release, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, State Awards 
Grants for Renewable Energy Technologies, 07-031 (Feb. 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/news/2007/02/0222_01.htm  (quoting Lt. Gov. Jeff 
Kottkamp as saying, “Investments in cutting-edge ventures ensure a stronger economy 
and a cleaner environment”).  The release continues: “Through the 2006 Florida Energy 
Act, the Florida Legislature appropriated $15 million for renewable energy technologies 
grants to stimulate capital investment in the state and promote and enhance the 
statewide utilization of renewable energy technologies . . . .”  Id. 
 243. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 646. 
 244. Id. at 645-47. 
 245. Pub. L. No. 93-473, 88 Stat. 1431 (1974). 
 246. Pub. L. No. 93-410, 88 Stat. 1079 (1974). 
 247. Pub. L. No. 93-403, 88 Stat. 802 (1974). 
 248. Pub. L. No. 96-345, 94 Stat. 1139 (1980). 
 249. See Energy Info. Admin., Public Laws Regarding Renewables, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/legislation/publiclaw.html. 
 250. See http://www.nrel.gov for more information. 
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woes,251 NREL’s technological development programs received more 
R&D awards than any other Department of Energy laboratory.252  
Administered by the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (“EERE”), NREL has a program for 
the study and advancement of nearly all forms of renewable energy.253  
For instance, since 1980, turbine design, acoustic studies, and other 
issues relating to wind power are run by the National Wind Technology 
Center (“NWTC”) in Boulder, Colo., part of the DOE’s Office of Wind 
and Hydropower Technologies.254  The industry-cooperative arm of 
NWTC, the Wind Partnerships for Advanced Component Technology 
(“WindPACT”) has a stated objective of lowering the cost of wind 
energy per kilowatt hour to 3.6 cents (not including the production tax 
credit), and already claims to have contributed to its dramatic decrease 
in price and corresponding rise in efficiency over the last twenty-five 
years.255
In many states, R&D financing for renewables, as well as 
infrastructural modernization, grid integration, and other improvements 
is covered by a “system benefits fund.”256  The fund itself is essentially a 
trust fund or a bank account whose money is appropriated to meet state 
energy mandates.257  In California, the fund is financed by placing 
charges on utility companies for each unit of electricity they sell.258  
Between 1998 and 2002, $540 million was generated for such projects, 
with 45% going to existing facilities, 30% going to new facilities, and 
the remaining money going to lower costs of renewable power for 
consumers,259 meaning the program can be shaped to meet the priorities 
of the legislature that enacts it. 
Just as the capital subsidization programs encourage the 
improvement and construction of renewable energy facilities, the 
production incentive angle of supply-side policy is concerned with 
 251. See U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention, supra note 111. 
 252. See NREL Overview, available at http://www.nrel.gov/overview. 
 253. See NREL’s Research and Technology Development, available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/research.html. 
 254. See http://www.nrel.gov/wind/facilities.html. 
 255. See http://www.nrel.gov/wind/advanced_technology.html. 
 256. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 37. System benefits funds are also known 
as a “system benefits charge” or a “public benefit fund.”  Pater, supra note 168, at 37. 
 257. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 26-28. 
 258. See NREL Policies and Market Factors, supra note 106, at 8. 
 259. Id. 
2007 RESHAPING ENERGY INVESTMENT AND 1043 
 REDUCING FOSSIL FUEL EXTERNALITIES 
 
encouraging the operation of these facilities, either through direct 
incentives for capital investment or indirectly using tax credits.260  
Legislation in this mould is most often associated with tax policy and 
production grants.261  In the same 2006 legislation that established their 
R&D grant,262 Florida implemented a corporate production tax credit of 
$0.01 per kilowatt hour.263  Together with the research matching grant, 
Florida has sought to bridge both gaps in normal electricity production: 
development capital and output.264  Likewise, in 1978, one year after the 
creation of the Department of Energy, the federal government instituted 
its first production tax credit.265
Congress passed the National Energy Act that year in part as an 
effort to encourage investment in renewable energy technology, broaden 
the national power grid, and allow small-scale renewable energy 
producers, including wind, the right to sell their product to public utility 
companies.266  Included within was the Energy Tax Act (“ETA”).267  
The ETA provided residential energy producers income tax credits for 
solar and wind-based electricity production equipment installed on the 
premises: 30% of the first $2,000 and 20% for the next $8,000.268  
Similarly, the ETA authorized an additional 10% business tax credit for 
investment in wind, solar, geothermal, and ocean thermal technologies 
on top of the standard 10% investment tax credit,269 which was later 
 260. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12 (outlining types of policies that promote the 
production of renewable-based energy via private investment and in particular 
incentives that pay out to investors based on electricity generated and those that reduce 
tax exposure to investors through production tax credits). 
 261. See id.; see also DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (Table of Financial Incentives 
for Renewable Energy), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/financial. 
cfm?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=0&RE=1 (providing links to the incentive policies 
adopted by each state and the federal government and illustrating the prevalence of tax-
based legislation and grants, loans, and rebates used to subsidize and encourage the 
production of renewable energy). 
 262. FLA. STAT. § 377.801 (2006). 
 263. FLA. STAT. § 220.193 (2006). 
 264. See Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Florida’s Energy Plan, at 
45-47 (Jan. 17, 2006). 
 265. See Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978). 
 266. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647-48 (providing an 
explanation of the ETA and PURPA and their effects on the energy marketplace). 
 267. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978). 
 268. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647. 
 269. Id. 
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repealed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.270  While Congress 
extended certain business tax credits for renewables in the act, the ETA 
business tax credit for wind was allowed to expire at the end of 1985.271  
During this time, however, California, the most populous state, matched 
the 1978 ETA’s business investment tax credit between 1980 and 
1983,272 and soon became the leader in renewable energy production.  
Until 2006, when it was surpassed by Texas, California had been the 
largest wind energy producer in the country for nearly twenty-five 
years.273
By the end of the 1980s, as fossil fuel costs decreased, the only way 
possible to meet the electricity production cost disparity between 
renewables and fossil fuels was to go back to Congress and push for new 
incentives.274  The Energy Policy Act of 1992275 included a $0.015 per 
kilowatt hour (annually adjusted for inflation) Production Tax Credit 
(“PTC”) for private or investor-owned wind, solar, geothermal, and 
biomass facilities.276  For publicly-owned utilities producing energy 
from the same renewable sources, the Act instituted a $0.015 per 
kilowatt hour “Renewable Energy Production Incentive” (“REPI”).277  
While the PTC was available to solar and geothermal power generators 
indefinitely, wind power producers could only claim the credit for the 
first ten years of operation of a qualified facility.278  As technology 
improved, however, the PTC stimulated a modest growth in wind farm 
construction and wind energy output and consumption, which rose from 
30 trillion Btu in 1992 to 70 trillion Btu in 2001 when the initial PTC 
expired.279
After 2001, the PTC went through a series of extensions and 
renewals,280 facilitating a boom-and-bust cycle over the next five 
 270. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See NREL, Policies and Market Factor, supra note 106, at 7. 
 273. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, News Release, AWEA Quarterly Market Report: 
Texas Overtakes California As Top Wind Energy State, July 25, 2006, available at 
http://awea.org/newsroom/releases/AWEA_Quarterly_Market_Report_072506.html. 
 274. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8. 
 275. Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
 276. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (1992) (amended 2006). 
 277. See 26 U.S.C. § 13317 (1992) (amended 2005); see also Renewable Energy 
Report, supra note 58, at 648. 
 278. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647. 
 279. Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. 
 280. See infra notes 282-90. 
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years.281  In 2002, the PTC was extended to 2003 as part of the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, expiring December 31, 
2003.282  The following October, the PTC was again extended by the 
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004283 to December 31, 2005.284  
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004285 expanded the list of 
qualified electricity production facilities eligible for the PTC.286  
However, the Act also added a tax credit, in the amount of $5.48 per ton 
produced and sold from facilities placed in operation after October 22, 
2004, for the production of refined coal.287
Thirteen years after the first PTC was authorized, Congress passed 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) and raised the credit to 
$0.019 per kilowatt hour, adjusted annually for inflation, and extended it 
through 2007. 288  In another alteration to the tax code, Congress applied 
the “Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System,” allowing developers 
who purchase solar, wind, or geothermal power-producing equipment to 
claim depreciation deductions on equipment faster than they otherwise 
would be allowed for such an investment.289
Beyond the start-again-stop-again nature of the PTC, a cycle which 
 281. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647 (“While the PTC was 
successful when in place, the “on and off” nature of its availability was disruptive to the 
steady pace of market development.”); see also L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 4 (“The 
impact of the PTC on the wind energy industry is evident in the boom-bust cycle of 
development in recent years.”). 
 282. H.R. 3090, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 283. H.R. 1308, 108th Cong. § 313 (2004). 
 284. DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (follow link to “Federal Incentives for 
Renewable Energy: Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit,”), available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/incentive2.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&Stat
e=federal&currentpageid=1&ee=0&re=1 (last visited May 27, 2007). 
 285. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat 1418. 
 286. I.R.C. § 45 (2006). 
 287. See Internal Revenue Service Form 8835, “Renewable Electricity, Refined 
Coal, and Indian Coal Production Credit,” (2006) (illustrating not only the terms of the 
refined coal credit, but how various forms of energy production incentive tax 
legislation, with seemingly conflicting aims as far as the fossil fuel-renewable divide is 
concerned, are each expressed on the same federal tax form). 
 288. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat 594. 
 289. I.R.C. § 48 (2006) (setting class lives at the 5-year level); see Pater, supra note 
168, at 33 (indicating that the owner of this equipment could “take an additional 30% 
depreciation on these items during the first year, creating an even larger incentive for 
the technology”). 
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EPAct 2005 continued,290 the problem with the legislation as far as both 
the renewable energy industry and its non-commercially motivated 
proponents were concerned was that it, like electricity production 
policies before it, also included heavy appropriations to fossil fuel-based 
initiatives.291  The Act provided a 300 million barrel expansion to the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (from 700 million barrels to 1 billion), 
provided “accelerated review and approval process[es] for new refinery 
facilities,” and appropriated $1.8 billion worth of funding to subsidize 
costly “clean coal” facilities.292  The funding of both renewable energy 
and fossil fuels by the federal government show that Congress is most 
concerned with keeping prices down for electricity rather than 
promoting a particular industry over another.  Given the stark 
differences between the two candidates for legislative support, Congress 
seems to have disregarded fossil fuel externalities.  When taking into 
account the capital-intensive nature of “clean coal,” in which one of the 
most promising procedures involves burning gasified coal and pumping 
a mixture of the fumes under ground risking leaks and water 
contamination,293 the federal government appears to be, as the adage 
goes, “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”  Critics cite that the only parties who 
benefit from a boondoggle like this are fossil-fuel burning utilities, 
mining companies, and energy lobbyists.294
Presently, it is at the state level where the most innovative and 
effective supply-side measures are pursued to promote renewable-based 
 290. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat 594 (setting a relatively short-term sunset for 
the PTC—Dec. 31, 2007).  It has since been renewed to Dec. 31, 2008 by The Tax 
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat 2922. 
 291. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224. 
 292. U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce Press Office, Energy Policy Act 
of 2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, at 2 (2005). 
 293. See Thomas Wilson & Charles Clark, Financing Clean Coal, Public Utilities 
Fortnightly, June 2005, at 73, 74-75 (explaining that the government-favored emissions-
reducing technique behind “clean coal” involves burning high-grade bituminous coal, 
steam, and oxygen under high pressure and mixing the resulting combustible gas with 
steam and sequestering it underground; and stating further that financing such facilities 
require taxpayer resources); Robert H. Socolow, Can We Bury Global Warming, 
Scientific American, July 2005, at 49, 54-55 (listing the possible environmental risks to 
carbon sequestration); Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 7-8 (mentioning carbon 
sequestration as another externality associated with coal use). 
 294. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224 (pointing out that 
energy corporations have spent over $100 million in campaign contributions over the 
past decade). 
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energy systems.295  In New York, for example, facilities built for 
photovoltaic, biomass, and wind power systems and their corresponding 
equipment are all exempt from state property tax for fifteen years.296  
This not only gives an incentive to utility-scale producers, but also to 
small-scale, end-use consumers who can install small wind turbines or 
photovoltaic panels for their own electricity needs.297  In fact, property 
tax incentives for various forms of renewable energy are available in 
twenty-six states,298 and seventeen offer some form of personal tax 
deduction for renewable energy use,299 usually for expenses incurred in 
the installation of renewable energy systems like solar heating devices 
for pools300 or green energy-fueled buildings,301 or for construction of 
wind farms on ranch land.302  By building supply from the ground up, 
the end-use consumers are not only educated about the science and 
benefits of renewable energy in general, they become active participants 
with a commercial stake in renewable energy policy. 
“Net metering” rules have similar effects as personal and property 
tax exemptions and credits but act on the relationship between the 
residential supplier/consumer and the utility company, rather than on the 
relationship between the taxpayer and the government.303  Forty states 
and the District of Columbia have instituted some form of net 
metering,304 and Congress, as part of EPAct 2005, has since applied net 
metering rules to all domestic public utility companies.305  The standard 
 295. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 648 (highlighting “tax 
benefits, grants, loans and loan guarantees” as among the measures “augmenting federal 
policies”). 
 296. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax § 487(2) (2006). 
 297. See id. (giving no ownership restrictions in statute). 
 298. DSIRE Website, supra note 20. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1083 (2006) (providing tax credit for solar 
energy devices). 
 301. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-722 (West 2001) (providing tax credit 
for green buildings). 
 302. See id.; but see id. at § 10-722(a)(3)(ii) (stating that the purchase costs of the 
wind turbines themselves are not included in the allowable costs). 
 303. See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 39; Gipe, supra note 26, at 11. 
 304. DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (“Net Metering Rules,” available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/NetMetering_Map.ppt). 
 305. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, State Energy 
Alternatives: Net Metering, available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/alternatives/ 
net_metering.cfm. 
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net metering scheme includes an end-use consumer who contributes to 
his or her own electricity use through the use of some renewable energy 
installation—like solar panels or a small wind turbine.306  The rules 
essentially require that utility companies (in some states only investor-
owned utilities) charge the consumer for just the net amount of 
electricity the utility provides.307  In effect, consumers are selling back 
to the utility the electricity generated by their renewable energy 
facilities, and utilities are charging them only for the difference between 
the energy they produce and the energy they consume.308
B. Building Markets: Demand-Side Renewable Electricity Policy 
Net metering, by forcing the utility companies to purchase back the 
energy produced from non-utility-owned sources, actually straddles the 
line between supply- and demand-side policies.  The Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act,309 or “PURPA”, represents the operational 
counterpart to net metering.  The legislation, passed in 1978 as part of 
the Energy Policy Act, created a category of non-utility-owned 
electricity producers called “Qualifying Facilities” (“QFs”),310 which are 
smaller-sized independent renewable power producers.311  The QFs were 
given a market by PURPA in an effort to encourage renewable energy 
production.312  PURPA mandated that utilities buy the electricity output 
from these outside power companies while exempting the independent 
producers from the taxes and regulations associated with utility power 
projects.313  Eventually, the Solar, Wind, and Geothermal Power 
 
 306. See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 39. 
 307. Id.; see also Gipe, supra note 26, at 11 (analogizing that “net metering allows 
access on the customer side of the meter”). 
 308. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 11. 
 309. Pub. L. No. 95-617 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 796 (2005). 
 310. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: 
Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L. 
J. 35, 80-81 (2005) (explaining the history and rationale for PURPA and its place in the 
scheme of energy deregulation). 
 311. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(C)(ii), (18)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 312. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA) (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_ 
energy_policies/public-utility-regulatory-policy-act-purpa.html [hereinafter 
Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act]. 
 313. See Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stoermer, The Energy Policy Act of 
2005: PURPA Reform, the Amendments and Their Implications, 27 ENERGY L. J. 25, 
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Production Incentives Act of 1990314 removed the electricity output 
qualifications for PURPA.315
The QFs signed distribution contracts in the late 1970s and early 
1980s with the utilities while the price of fossil fuel energy was still 
relatively high.316  PURPA, though it ended the virtual monopoly of 
utility-owned power sources,317 only required utilities to purchase the 
output of independent producers at “avoided cost,” or what it would 
have cost the utility to produce the energy themselves.318  Since the vast 
majority of utility-owned and operated power came from fossil fuels,319 
once the price of natural gas, coal, and petroleum decreased, the utilities 
could certainly honor their contracts with the independent producers.  
However, those producers were finding it increasingly difficult and 
eventually impossible to meet their own production costs.320  The price 
of fossil fuels, and thus the utility’s avoided cost, simply fell farther than 
renewables technology could match.321  Many renewable-based 
independent power companies, once their contracts securing favorable 
prices expire, face bankruptcy.322  Despite the legislation’s inability to 
promote the long-term growth of renewables in the electric power 
market, 12,000 megawatts of non-hydro renewables-based electricity 
were integrated into the national power grid by 1998 as a result of 
PURPA.323
A modern approach to legislatively ensuring a renewables market 
was needed.  By the early 1990s, the electricity-regulatory paradigm had 
shifted toward the promotion of competition inside the energy 
industry.324  The renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) emerged as an 
option to sustain renewable energy’s progress in a changing electricity 
30-31 (2006). 
 314. Pub. L. No. 101-575, 104 Stat 2834. 
 315. Energy Info. Admin., Public Laws Regarding Renewables, available at  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/legislation/publiclaw.html. 
 316. See Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, supra note 312 
 317. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority 
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L. J. 1, 6 (2005). 
 318. Id. 
 319. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 99. 
 320. See Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, supra note 312. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 648. 
 324. See Kelliher, supra note 317, at 7. 
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marketplace.325  The RPS’s flexibility is part of its strength, as it can be 
implemented in a variety of ways to suit the policy ends of the 
legislature.326  The common denominator is that a quota of electricity 
within a state or nation must be produced, sold, or consumed by a 
specified time in the future.327  In all, twenty-two states and the District 
of Columbia have instituted some form of RPS.328  California requires 
that the state’s investor-owned utilities obtain and distribute 33% of their 
power from renewable energy sources by 2020.329  Texas, by contrast, 
eschews a proportional standard and instead dictates that its renewable 
energy capacity reach 5,880 megawatts by 2015.330  Interestingly, the 
development of the Texas RPS was derived in part through “deliberative 
polling,” where utilities and regulators estimated the potential demand 
for renewable energy through customer polling data. 331  New York has 
perhaps the most ambitious RPS, mandating that a full 25% of the 
state’s energy be derived from renewable sources by 2013.332
By 2020, 40,000 megawatts of new renewable energy capacity are 
projected to come online because of state standards mandating 
renewable energy.333  According to NREL, the RPS is the most effective 
“policy driver” at the state level to encourage wind power 
development.334  Between 2001 and 2004, about half of the nation’s 
4,300 megawatts of newly installed wind energy capacity results from 
RPS policies.335  If “set-asides” for solar energy are included, by 2020 
an additional 1,000 megawatts of photovoltaic power could be 
 325. See Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, Renewable 
Portfolio Standards: An Effective Policy to Support Clean Energy Supply 1 (Dec. 30, 
2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/chp/pdf/rps_factsheet_123006.pdf (“An RPS 
creates market demand for renewable and clean energy supplies.”). 
 326. See id. at 3-4. 
 327. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 7-9; Sawin, supra  note 22, at 6; see also Policies 
to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 19 (referencing the Dutch 1997 “Action 
Programme for Renewable Energy” which “sets targets of meeting 5% and 10% of the 
nation’s total energy demand with renewable sources in 2010 and 2020, respectively”). 
 328. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 4.  The Illinois standard is not mandatory.  Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 11. 
 332. Rabe, supra note 195, at 4. 
 333. See Successful Strategies, supra note 18. 
 334. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 39. 
 335. See Van der Linden, supra note 180, at 45. 
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contributed.336  For example, Texas raised its RPS target of 1,280 
megawatts for 2003 to 2,880 megawatts in renewable capacity by 2009 
and saw 1,332 megawatts of wind power alone come online by the 
middle of 2005,337 prompting the eventual 3,000 megawatt expansion to 
the RPS for 2015.338  The EIA found that in incrementally raising the 
RPS bar by 2.5% every few years until it reached 10% between 2020 
and 2030, the effects would be dramatic.339  By 2025, without a national 
RPS, wind power generation is expected to be 32.0 billion kilowatt-
hours.340  With the 10% RPS, wind power generation rises to 140.7 
billion kilowatt-hours.341  Biomass is also projected to grow, particularly 
when used in a co-firing facility.342
New power facilities also mean new jobs.  The Tennessee Valley 
Authority (“TVA”), in an assessment of how it would meet a 10% 
federal RPS by 2020, indicates it would need to generate a total of 19.7 
billion kilowatt-hours from renewables.343  Of that total, approximately 
2.3 billion kilowatt-hours would come from wind power and 10.9 billion 
from biomass.  With the inclusion of solar, hydro-power, landfill gas, 
and wastewater gas, the total becomes 15.25 billion kilowatt-hours 
generated within the TVA’s boundaries.344  To make up the difference, 
4.45 billion kilowatt-hours of renewable energy credits would have to be 
purchased.345  The generation of that much renewable energy by the 
TVA is projected to create almost 45,000 new jobs, mostly in rural areas 
of the American Southeast.346  Per 1,000 megawatt-hours of renewable 
energy produced, 1.09 jobs are created on the “operating” side, whereas 
1.86 new jobs are created on the investment side, with more than 3,000 
 336. Id. at 46. 
 337. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 11. 
 338. Id. at 12 (stipulating a total of 5,880 megawatts). 
 339. See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 10, 13 
(documenting the proposed legislative targets and tabulating the corresponding 
projections). 
 340. See id at 13. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. See Jack Barkenbus et al., Resource and Employment Impact of a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard in the Tennessee Valley Authority Region, at 15 (University of 
Tennessee Institute for a Secure and Sustainable Environment 2006). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 30. 
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jobs attributed to solar technologies and more than 23,000 jobs for wind 
technologies throughout North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee, 
Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi.347
Though the RPS shifts the demand curve vis-à-vis electricity 
retailers by artificially setting a market floor for what they have to 
sell,348 it naturally boosts supply for end-use consumers.349  This effect 
is so significant that the policy could easily be deemed primarily supply-
side.350  The unusual nature of the potential impact of the RPS is that 
depending on how it is structured, both the demand curve (electricity 
delivered to users) and the supply curve (renewable power project 
construction and electricity production) can be shifted.351  The policy 
question going forward asks how the RPS can be structured to maximize 
both the necessary commercial benefits to the renewable energy industry 
and still ensure mitigation of the enormous costs to society attributable 
to fossil fuels.352  The best organ to ensure the equitable distribution of 
renewable power while most effectively meeting the needs of the 
emerging renewable power industry is Congress.353  Despite several 
attempts to do so, the federal government has yet to implement such a 
standard.354
 347. Id. at 31-32. 
 348. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 6. 
 349. See van der Linden et al., supra note 180, at 45-46. 
 350. See generally, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Energy-Environment Guide to 
Action: Policies, Best Practices, and Action Steps for States 5-1 to 5-21 (2006) 
(classifying state portfolio standards as a “supply action”). 
 351. See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 35: 
If the RPS establishes a goal that appropriately exceeds the level of existing 
renewable generation in the state, the immediate benefits will accrue to the producer 
of the renewable energy technology.  The RPS immediately increases the demand for 
renewable technologies, bringing the market a step closer to generating an economy 
of scale. 
Id. 
 352. See Rabe, supra note 195, at v (suggesting in the executive summary that 
economic concerns are paramount to legislatures while environmental concerns are a 
side benefit). 
 353. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 45 (explaining that if the country as a whole is 
to realize the environmental and economic benefits of renewable energy, states and the 
federal government ought to use current state policies as models on which to base future 
policies; thus, to ensure comprehensive national results, Congress, as the federal 
legislature, must act). 
 354. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Renewing America’s Economy (Jan. 2007), 
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/Renewing-
Americas-Economy-2005.pdf  (“The U.S. Senate has passed a 10% by 2020 national 
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IV. PLUGGING IN: THE TRIPLE THREAT OF TRANSMISSION COSTS, 
VARIABILITY, AND GRID INTEGRATION 
A. The Challenges and Some Possible Solutions 
Unlike fossil fuel energy, renewable power is intermittent in nature, 
wind among them.355  Electricity can be produced from wind only when 
it is blowing at a sufficient rate and in a sufficient volume, which is not 
always regular and not always predictable.356  Power grids, designed for 
the constant and predictable output of fossil fuels,357 require a reserve 
capacity in order to control for outages caused by a system fault.358  This 
security standard for the overall reliability of the grid is called the “loss 
of load probability”—the “probability that the load will exceed the 
available generation.”359  Power production facilities must schedule time 
on the grid in advance in order to transmit electricity to the consumer.360  
A degree of uncertainty is factored into the transmission system by 
integrating intermittent electricity production into a grid.361  The grid 
operator must balance the uncertain supply with the predicted demand 
for power.362  This is the point at which supply-side policy deviates from 
incentivizing production and moves toward infrastructural necessities.363
The question becomes a matter of whether the grid has the 
flexibility to withstand these kinds of output fluctuations.364  The 
International Energy Agency argues that basic electrical engineering 
 
standard three times since 2002—most recently in June 2005.”). 
 355. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 9. 
 356. Id. at 12. 
 357. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the 
construction and development of the national power grid); Monthly Energy Review: 
March 2007, supra note 6, at 99 (illustrating the relative dominance of fossil fuels in the 
electric power sector since 1973). 
 358. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 17-18. 
 359. Id. at 17. 
 360. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 12, 19. 
 361. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 18-19 (explaining that the 
increase in unpredictability of power supply due to intermittent sources operating on the 
grid can increase the needed operational reserve capacity). 
 362. Id. at 17. 
 363. See DOE, Grid Study, supra note 7, at 8 (tying policies that encourage 
economic investment to the need for “modernizing the structure and operation of the 
nation’s transmission systems”). 
 364. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 20. 
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principles suggest that enlarging and integrating the grid on a national or 
international scale will control for variations.365  Furthermore, the larger 
the integrated grid becomes the less of a need exists to keep fossil fuel 
generation running constantly, even at a low scale.366  With improved 
weather forecasting, geographic dispersal of wind or other renewable 
energy sources can actually broaden their potential market infiltration by 
reducing the reliance of the grid on one source of power.367  In the event 
that large scale climactic occurrences severely depress wind energy 
output, several options exist to compensate for intermittent output.368
Obviously the first option is the one currently used to ensure grid 
security against intermittency of production—keep fossil fuel plants 
online in order to compensate for potential variability.369  The second, a 
more eco-friendly option, is to implement “hydro storage facilities.”370  
Hydro storage is currently the best established and most reliable form of 
electricity storage, whether in a pumped-hydro or hydro reservoir 
facility.371  Moreover, the co-joining of wind facilities and hydro plants 
has been suggested as a method of facilitating the integration of wind 
energy into the power grid.372  The process involves two connected 
bodies of water, one at a higher elevation, the other at a lower 
elevation.373  As with any hydro power facility, the force of the water, in 
this case due to gravity, turns turbines which produce electricity.374  In 
this case, a wind farm would be attached to the hydro power facility.375  
Excess power produced by the wind farm that would otherwise not go to 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See, e.g., id. at 25 (citing a study in Germany that found that “the extension of 
wind power to some 36 [gigawatts] in 2015 would not require the addition of new 
plants to provide operational reserve,” and a finding by the French grid operator RTE 
that “short-term fluctuations of 10 [gigawatt] installed wind capacity would not exceed 
100 [megawatt] within 1 minute, a figure which can be absorbed within current 
dimensioning of reserves without problems”). 
 368. Id. at 26 (listing solutions that would control for intermittency). 
 369. See id. at 26-27. 
 370. See id. at 27 (discussing hydro-storage as one of several storage technologies). 
 371. Id. 
 372. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 656. 
 373. See Gemma Allen et al., Modeling of a Wind-Pumped Hydro Scheme Within 
the Irish Liberalised Electricity Market, at 2 (European Wind Energy Conference 
2006), available at http://www.ucc.ie/serg/pub/ewecga.pdf. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
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the grid (e.g., if it were not currently scheduled to be online), would 
pump the water from the lower elevation basin to the upper.376  During 
times when the wind was insufficient to meet the grid’s electricity 
demand, the hydro facility would release the stored water from the 
higher-elevation facility back through the power-producing turbines.377  
In the event of a supply shortage, a hydro storage facility is capable of 
replacing a traditional power station for several hours if necessary, with 
a potential 1,000 megawatt capacity at the typical 80% round-trip 
efficiency.378
Another option is to interconnect and integrate contiguous grids in 
an effort to further expand supply potential.379  In Europe, where 
countries are geographically smaller in scale to the United States, grid 
interconnectivity between countries can act as a model to domestic 
regional grid management.380  The obstacle to efficient interconnection 
in Europe is nearly identical to the one in the United States—
infrastructure.381  The IEA estimates that by 2030, OECD countries as a 
whole will need to invest $1.8 trillion for grid maintenance and upgrades 
as demand grows.382  One such strategy is the proposed “wind pipeline,” 
supported by the AWEA and Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota.383  
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 27. 
 379. Id. at 29; U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 24-29 (discussing 
the establishment of regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) that would 
“coordinate markets and ensure the reliability of the nation’s transmission system,” 
including ensuring fair wholesale energy markets). 
 380. See, e.g., 2006 O.J. (L 262) 1 (iterating the priorities of European 
interconnection projects and policies). 
 381. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 30 (explaining how there exists a 
“need for further transmission grid development, including strengthening and upgrading 
existing lines . . .” and that the “interconnection of grids is frequently seen as an 
important step towards improved competition and full market liberalization . . . in 
Europe and North America”). 
 382. Id. 
 383. See Caldwell, supra note 206; see also Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Concept 
Description: Trans-Prairie and Interior West Wind ‘Pipelines’ (Sept. 6, 2003), available 
at http://www.awea.org/policy/documents/WindPipeline.pdf (explaining that “each 
‘pipeline’ would consist of three phases”); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind Power Advocate 
Interview: Jay Haley, EAPC Architects Engineers (June 1, 2005), 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/windpoweringamerica/filter_detail.asp?item
id=947 (discussing Senator Dorgan’s wind conferences and “Heartland Wind Pipeline” 
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The AWEA proposal, which would cost between $10 billion and $20 
billion,384 envisions a regulatory scheme that ensures a closer-to-
capacity power line use with non-discriminatory access, with $1 billion 
worth of local 345 kilovolt transmission lines added to the grid to avoid 
“bottlenecks and bolster secondary-level reliability.”385 This first step 
would open 26,000 megawatts of wind power capacity. 386  Next, two 
high-voltage lines from the northern plains, going east and west, would 
be built to streamline supply to population centers on the coasts and the 
industrial Midwest.  Adding between 30,000 and 60,000 megawatts of 
wind power capacity to the system, it would be “enough new power to 
serve up to 18 million homes.”387
The problem with improving infrastructure is that the electricity 
market does not operate in a unified manner as part of one large 
integrated grid, but as a community of smaller regionally managed 
electricity administrators.388  Several regional and state transmission 
organizations, who determine which producers are permitted time on the 
grid, have gradually instituted discriminatory pricing schemes that 
essentially punish wind power generators for output variations.  Their 
rationale is that lower-than-expected production requires them to keep 
backup generators running, regardless of whether it costs the system.389  
proposal). 
 384. Caldwell, supra note 206. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining in Fig. 1.1 
that the North American Electricity Transmission Systems includes three interconnected 
“systems,” which in turn are comprised of 140 control areas who control local 
electricity operations and “coordinate reliability through 10 regional councils”). 
 389. See Imbalance Provisions for Intermittent Resources Assessing the State of 
Wind Energy in Wholesale Energy Markets, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,349, 21,349-50 (proposed 
Apr. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).  In this notice of proposed 
rulemaking, FERC acknowledged that tariff charges levied on intermittent resources 
have become outdated and have become “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory 
or preferential.”  Id.; see also Reeves, supra note 32, at 19 (listing the disadvantages 
that wind plants in particular have faced in dealing with utilities, including the 
regulatory infrastructure that was traditionally geared toward fossil fuels, fees charged 
to wind power producers for the distance the electricity traveled between its production 
site and the end-use consumer, charges for each transmission system through which the 
electricity travels (called “rate pancaking”), and charges based on peak output, rather 
than average output, which while not a major issue for fossil fuel producers, is 
important to wind power producers who have large differences between the two output 
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The recent granting of regulatory authority to FERC is a step toward 
reigning in the disparate interests playing out on the grid.390
B. Wind versus Utilities? 
Up until now, it would appear that wind power, like any 
intermittent renewable, is a veritable thorn in the side of utility 
companies who maintain infrastructure, distribute, and deliver electricity 
to the consumers.391  With the advent and growth of wind power, utility 
grid managers must go out of their way to adjust their scheduling 
formulae to accommodate what would on paper appear to be a marginal 
producer at the expense of the predictable, easy-to-manage fossil fuel 
facilities.392  Prior to FERC regulations mandating nondiscriminatory 
access rules,393 utilities could offset costs, even anticipated costs, 
resulting from the impact of output variability.394  Now, they are 
required to act in a non-discriminatory fashion toward wind power 
facilities.395  However, wind power is not all bad news for the utilities.396
Notwithstanding the fact that in certain regions wind is in fact the 
low-cost option,397 a wind energy production presence within the 
purview of a utility grid manager can be a boon.398  For instance, wind 
power, like all renewables, can help offset the risks of supply shortages 
in fossil fuels.399  Additionally, since wind power can be added 
incrementally, excess capacity costs are limited.400  The inherent 
 
numbers) (emphasis in the original). 
 390. See Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Aug. 8, 2006) 
(explaining the agency’s new responsibilities with regard to market manipulation and 
grid integration); S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 24-29 (referencing 
FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (2000), which “calls for the formation” of the 
RTOs discussed supra note 7). 
 391. See supra note 390 and accompanying text. 
 392. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 17-19. 
 393. See, e.g., Interconnection for Wind Energy, 111 FERC P 61,353, 2005 WL 
1318317 (“F.E.R.C.”). 
 394. See Reeves, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 395. See 111 FERC ¶ 61,353. 
 396. Reeves, supra note 32, at 13. 
 397. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 1. 
 398. Reeves, supra note 32, at 13. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
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disadvantage of the remoteness of wind facilities can actually be turned 
into an infrastructural benefit as electricity generation outposts situated 
throughout the grid can reduce the risks of voltage concentration and 
overload in the production areas, thereby reducing maintenance costs.401  
Furthermore, any government action on either the state or federal level 
to penalize distributors for creating pollution would make a renewable 
energy production facility a cost-saving asset.402  The same is true if the 
utility was faced with meeting a renewable portfolio standard that 
mandated it sell a certain quantity of electricity derived from non-
polluting sources.403
V. SAVING THE WORLD AND MAKING A BUCK AT THE SAME TIME: 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS FOR AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The burgeoning renewable energy industry, its investors, 404 and the 
public405 need Congress to implement a comprehensive national energy 
policy.  It must integrate market-focused initiatives without losing sight 
of the social reasons for promoting clean energy.  This includes 
programs that (1) aid renewable power producers, (2) marginalize fossil 
fuels to the extent possible, and (3) set a permanent standard for 
ensuring the place of renewable energy in the electricity market.  This 
Note proposes that the federal government can meet these ends.  To do 
so it must enact a scheme that incorporates elements of existing state and 
national policies while adding certain unique derivations. 
The first step is to ensure that current supply-side incentives will 
remain into the foreseeable future.  Otherwise disaster waits in the 
wings.406  In fact, during a period (January 1, 2004 to October 4, 2004) 
between an earlier version of the production tax credit’s expiration and 
subsequent renewal, a deceleration in the increase of new wind farm 
development407 made it clear to industry experts that the tax credits were 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 14 
 403. Id. 
 404. See Pater, supra note 168, at vi. 
 405. See Steven Clemmer et al. Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy 
Blueprint, at ix-x (2001). 
 406. See Wind Power is a Disruptive Technology that Promotes Positive Change, 
Energy Economist, Oct. 2006, at 10 [hereinafter Disruptive Technology] (explaining 
how “credit lapses in the past have caused market havoc”). 
 407. Id. 
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a necessary ingredient if long-term growth were to be assured.408  Once 
the federal tax credit was renewed, a sharp spike in wind facilities 
occurred.409  This legislative volatility has the unintended consequence 
of actually raising the price of wind power while the PTC is still in 
effect.  For example, steel supply shortages stemming from white-hot 
demand for wind power facilities410 caused a development bottleneck 
and a 30% cost increase for the turbines as projects scrambled to meet 
the anticipated PTC expiration of December 31, 2007.411  Many of the 
resulting projects came in over-budget or late, setting off credit 
problems for many producers.412  If wind power’s tax credit and 
production incentive, duly buffered against inflation, are assured long 
lives, steady, predictable growth will follow.413
Absent any other initiative, wind energy is competitive only when 
placed on a level playing field with fossil fuels.414  This requires the 
continuation of supply-side aid.415  The degree to which the federal 
government subsidizes fossil fuel technology,416 including the billions 
 408. See Caldwell, supra note 206 (referencing the blows sustained by the industry 
during previous expirations of the credit, including a delay in construction of new 
facilities worth a total of $3 billion after the 2001 expiration and asserting that the PTC 
needs to be extended for “several years to provide a signal of stability to the investment 
community”). 
 409. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406 (“When Congress let the credit 
expire in 2004, wind development slumped, with fewer than 500 [megawatts] of new 
projects installed.  But when the credit was re-instated for 2005, the country added a 
[then] record 2,400 [megawatts] of wind energy.”) 
 410. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406. 
 411. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207 
(2006) (extending the expiration of the PTC to Dec. 31, 2008). 
 412. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406. 
 413. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, Jan. 
2007, available at http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Subsidy.pdf [hereinafter Wind 
Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies] (referring to the need for long-term stability in 
government subsidies as a key component in wind facility manufacturers’ ability to 
secure more permanent investment). 
 414. See Burnett, supra note 54 (asserting, as a negative, that the wind power 
industry is reliant on government subsidies like the production tax credit to stay 
competitive). 
 415. See Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, supra note 413 (arguing that the 
production tax credit—a supply-side initiative—is required if the wind industry, or any 
energy industry, is to remain viable). 
 416. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224 and accompanying 
text; see also Reeves, supra note 32, at 21 (arguing that “because the human health and 
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appropriated to coal,417 oil, and gas418 in the same Energy Policy Act of 
2005 that extended the PTC and REPI for renewables for two more 
years, belies the undeniable fact that the energy market as a whole leans 
heavily on legislative aid.419  Wind power thus is no more beholden to 
Congress than any other energy source.  If the mandate to reduce 
dependence on foreign and polluting sources of energy is to be honored, 
the PTC and REPI must be extended indefinitely.420  The sooner they 
are, the sooner the stability can be ensured for the industry, thereby 
assuring a steady supply of inexhaustible energy.421
Research and development funds must continue to be allocated 
toward wind power development.  The PTC, REPI, and the accelerated 
depreciation plan can only be the tip of the sword however.  Successful 
state renewable energy plans rely on a bevy of supply-side incentives 
and demand-side initiatives to stimulate wind power development.422  
Research and development grants are credited with helping to improve 
turbine technology.423  The ability to build taller towers with larger 
rotors out of less costly material boosted efficiency and drove down 
prices424 to the point where wind energy in certain regions compares 
favorably with fossil fuels.425  By being able to produce more energy 
from the same amount of wind input, power production facilities can 
better overcome or control for unpredictable or variable output.426
Furthermore, the federal government should continue to offer low 
interest loans, or subsidize a percentage of the interest on private loans 
to alleviate high capital costs up front.427  By reducing the impact of 
one-time overhead expenses, risks to investors decrease.428  Over time as 
steady power output (achieved without corresponding fuel costs) 
environmental costs [of fossil fuels] are largely externalized and born by society [it 
creates] a subsidy of sorts to fossil fuel burners”). 
 417. See id. at 5 ($9 billion). 
 418. See id. at 1 ($6 billion combined). 
 419. See U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce Press Office, “Energy 
Policy Act of 2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” Apr. 2005. 
 420. See Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, supra note 413. 
 421. Id. 
 422. See L. Bird et al., supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 423. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4. 
 424. See id. at 4-7. 
 425. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 1. 
 426. See AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138. 
 427. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 20-21 
 428. Id. 
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compensates for initial capital outlays,429 the long-term risk that capital 
financers see in wind projects should dissipate.  The government simply 
needs to get the proverbial ball rolling. 
Congress also needs to enact a comprehensive national electricity 
distribution policy.  First, renewables like wind need their rights to fair 
transmission access vigorously protected by regulatory bodies like 
FERC.430  Next, infrastructural modernization including the 
implementation of an integrated grid must go hand in hand with the 
generalized promotion and finance of renewable-energy production 
facilities.431  A system benefits fund—a public trust fund used in many 
states to pay for projects like these—432 is the proper vehicle to provide 
grid-wide renovation and upkeep, finance innovation, and even partially 
compensate for fossil fuel-caused social costs. 
A. The System Benefits Fund: Like Social Security but Bigger, More 
Efficient, and Without the Higher Taxes or that Third Rail Problem 
Financing a national system benefits fund to accomplish such a 
wide range of policy objectives is ambitious, but it need not bankrupt the 
Treasury.  It must simply diversify its revenue streams.  Often, a system 
benefits fund receives its budget through consumption fees whereby 
consumers pay a charge per kilowatt-hour consumed on their electricity 
bill.433  That is not necessary however.  Instead, Congress should 
immediately begin scaling back fossil fuel subsidies.434  The recovered 
revenue would be reallocated to form the corpus of the fund.  That is not 
to say that Congress should enact an economy and jobs-killing law 
effective immediately, but over time, perhaps consistent with the gradual 
implementation of the renewable portfolio standard discussed below, 
billions of dollars in fossil fuel subsidies should be siphoned into the to 
fund.  Such a policy merely reflects the growing national mandate for 
 
 429. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 11. 
 430. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that not only do unfair 
transmission access pricing penalties negatively affect renewables, but that in doing so 
they would compel renewable-source power generators to mitigate by “bundling” their 
output with traditional power sources, thereby “reduc[ing] generator and marketer 
flexibility,” which could raise prices across the board). 
 431. Id. 
 432. See supra notes 256-59. 
 433. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 27. 
 434. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22. 
1062 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
renewable energy.435  Once capitalized, the fund should be structured for 
invested like a state pension fund – housed in the executive branch and 
administered by a committee of representatives from existing federal 
agencies like FERC, the EPA, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  Broadly defined funding priorities should be set by Congress, 
while specific project prerogatives could come through the constituent 
agencies and be voted on by the committee. 
Any revenue mechanism plan for the fund should include a Dirty 
Energy Tax on all fossil fuel energy merchants.436  Such a tax should 
increase at ever-increasing rates for power production that results in the 
emission of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, particulate matter, heavy metals, and volatile organic 
compounds.  As for how the charge is levied, the first step is to place a 
fee on the actual poundage of emissions released.437  Just as a portfolio 
standard awards credits based on kilowatt-hour sales,438 this tax could be 
partially derived from a charge on per kilowatt-hour sales of dirty 
power, with a statutory limitation against passing the charge onto the 
customer.  The Dirty Energy Tax revenue, specifically earmarked to do 
so, will provide regular income to the fund, like a commission, once 
recovered subsidy revenue is no longer sufficient.  Unlike Social 
Security, there should be no borrowing against the national system 
benefits fund; yet, like state pension funds, its capital ought to be 
invested on the open market.  Additionally, the proceeds of the fund 
ought to be treated in a manner similar to shareholder dividends—
distributable to particular projects only when the fund as a whole meets 
prescribed equity requirements—to help ensure solvency over time.  
This is especially important if the national system benefits fund is to 
have a wider social mandate. 
As in state versions, the fund is intended to finance infrastructural 
modernization, supply-side incentives for renewables, and clean 
electricity generation projects. 439  A national fund, however, can have 
 435. See Bird & Swezey, supra note 21, at 7 (showing evidence for that mandate—a 
growing number of “green power customers” in regulated and competitive energy 
markets). 
 436. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 36. 
 437. See id. 
 438. See infra notes 472-75 and accompanying text. 
 439. See, e.g., L. Bird et al., supra note 106 (including California, id. at 8-9, 
Minnesota, id. at 18, Oregon, id. at 22, Pennsylvania, id. at 30, and New York, id. at 33-
34). 
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the means to compensate the public for the externalities it has borne due 
to the market failure of pricing fossil fuel energy.  Therefore, a portion 
of the fund’s available assets should be set aside for environmental clean 
up and conservation,440 and to pay a percentage of the heath care costs 
for those who have fallen ill as the result of unavoidable exposure to 
toxic emissions.441  In short, because of the pervasive consequences that 
energy use has on society, energy policy should at least match the scope 
and gravity of those effects.  A fund of this magnitude and purpose can 
help facilitate such mandate. 
B. Bringing it All Together: The National Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Two-Tiered Plan 
There are essentially two ways of looking at the legislative and 
regulatory policies pertaining to renewable energy in general and wind 
energy in particular—the industry perspective442 and the social 
perspective.443  The two perspectives, while not mutually exclusive, do 
stem from wholly distinct motivations.  An individual’s inclination 
toward one view, therefore, will tend to characterize their energy policy 
analysis.444  The industry perspective is concerned primarily with energy 
investors or potential energy investors looking at the policies affecting 
wind power with an eye for how the commercial viability of this product 
and this industry are influenced, both in the short-term and the long-
term.445  Legislation that presents a clear roadmap to industry growth 
 
 440. Administered by the EPA. 
 441. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 8 (listing the adverse health consequences 
related to power plant pollution).  Under this Note’s proposal, private claims would be 
adjudicated at the agency level in the mould of claims made under the Social Security 
Act, with the burden of proof and appeals process being the same. 
 442. See generally Caldwell, supra note 206 (illustrating the “wish list” the wind 
power industry has vis-à-vis governmental action). 
 443. See generally Schneider, supra note 1 (explaining how fossil fuel power plants 
are responsible for illness, death, incapacitation, deprivation of the labor force, et 
cetera). 
 444. See, e.g., id. at 12-15, 17, 22 (evaluating several pieces of proposed and enacted 
legislation on the basis of how effective they are at curbing fossil fuel power plant 
pollution with respect to health effects, and the monetization thereof, and aggregate 
pollutants capped). 
 445. See, e.g., Sawin, supra note 22 (discussing the economics of renewable energy 
markets and policies used both domestically and abroad to promote the renewable 
power industry). 
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attracts capital, whereas no roadmap or an indiscernible, contradictory 
roadmap chases capital away.446  The social perspective is concerned 
mainly with environmental,447 health,448 and political issues.449  
Questions about the externalities of fossil fuels,450 including wide-
ranging topics like global warming,451 disease,452 and the international 
balance of power are all aspects of the social perspective.453  Legislation 
that promotes the renewable energy business is all well and good here, 
but only as a means to affecting an end.454
The RPS is a tool that can act directly on any or all of the following 
 446. See id. at 26-27. 
 447. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 17. 
 448. Id. at 13. 
 449. See, e.g., Western Hemisphere Energy Security: Testimony Before Comm. on 
Int’l Relations Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of Karen A. 
Harbert, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy), available at  
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa26334.000/hfa26334_0.HTM (stating 
the strategic importance of energy policy in U.S.-Latin American relations); U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2, at 34-35 (discussing the relevance of 
congressional energy policy adjustments in the context of global energy markets—
specifically relating to China). 
 450. See Schneider, supra note 1 at 12-15, 17, 22 and accompanying text (analyzing 
several pieces of proposed and enacted legislation on the basis of how effective they are 
in curbing fossil fuel power plant pollution with respect to health effects, and the 
monetization thereof, and aggregate pollutants capped). 
 451. See Pater, supra note 168, at 19-20 (discussing the benefits to a company that 
reduces its contribution to climate change). 
 452. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 8 (illustrating the significant health effects 
attributed to fossil fuel power plant pollution). 
 453. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2 
(studying the impacts of energy policy in the United States and China with regard to 
environmental, economic, and security concerns). 
 454. See, e.g., Successful Strategies, supra note 18.  The first line reads: “In order to 
ensure healthy air and a stable climate for our children and grandchildren, we must 
make responsible decisions about our energy sources. Existing technologies and 
forward-thinking policies offer practical and affordable solutions o reduce our 
dependence on the fossil fuels that currently dominate America’s electricity system.”  
Id.  The article goes on to explain, after citing the megawatt capacity increases due to 
state RPSs, that renewable portfolio standards, “in addition to realizing significant 
reduction of harmful emissions, the states have found that [RPSs] are an effective 
means to help meet critical fuel diversity, energy security, and economic goals.”  Id.  
Cf. Rabe, supra note 195, at 6 (stating that in the motivation for developing an RPS, 
environmental benefits “are deemed ancillary to a variety of economic advantages seen 
as accruing from an RPS”). 
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market entities: the power producer, retailer, or consumer.455  The aim is 
to promote renewable energy and thereby in a once-removed fashion 
enable the growth of the business of renewable power production while 
allowing for reductions in fossil fuel use and all that entails.456  If 
renewables become more prevalent, costs might go down, the 
renewables industry could take off, the environment might improve, or 
health concerns could dissipate, et cetera.457  In short, the RPS is a catch-
all remedy that is increasingly seen as an energy policy panacea.458
Given that nearly half the states have adopted some form of a 
portfolio standard, it is not surprising that speculation exists regarding 
the eventuality and design of a national RPS.459  The AWEA is one such 
organization seeking the enactment of a national RPS.460  Their 
proposal, not surprisingly, is perfectly suited for the long-term 
commercial health and growth of renewable power producers.461  Using 
the Clean Air Act’s sulfur dioxide regulation as a model,462 the AWEA 
sets forth a plan that, while light on specific figures, completely 
encapsulates the industry perspective in its underlying enforcement 
mechanism.463
If a national RPS is indeed on the horizon, a two-tiered approach 
that satisfactorily accounts for both the industry and social perspectives 
 455. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 5 (specifying that all RPSs to date act on energy 
suppliers—this Note proposes that an RPS can act on energy consumers as well if it is 
structured the right way). 
 456. See id. at 6. 
 457. See, e.g., id. (explaining that one of the “biggest factors” weighing in favor of a 
state’s passage of an RPS is the perception that doing so facilitates economic 
development); Successful Strategies, supra note 18 (asserting that with a 20% national 
RPS by 2020, carbon dioxide emissions would be halved from their currently projected 
levels); Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, supra note 325 (listing 
the benefits afforded by an RPS as including: environmental improvement; energy 
security; lower natural gas prices; reduction in power price volatility; new jobs; and 
broader local tax bases). 
 458. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, supra note 
325 (illustrating the wide scope of concerns potentially addressed by an RPS). 
 459. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 25-26. 
 460. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Factsheet, National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, available at http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdf/Federal_RPS_Factsheet.pdf. 
 461. See RPS Overview, supra note 17 (emphasizing the “sustainability” of the 
renewable electricity industry that would be realized with the adoption of an RPS). 
 462. Id.; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25. 
 463. See RPS Overview, supra note 17; see also Pater, supra note 168, at 34. 
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is warranted.464  The AWEA proposal falls short from an industry 
standpoint in that it fails to appropriately set the means by which the 
standard comes to fruition.  It falls short from the social standpoint in 
that it fails to account for the likely concentration of the burdens of 
fossil fuels in specific geographic areas.465  An RPS—especially a 
national one—in addition to the fundamental structure of any quota466 
must set bars that are realistically attainable but ambitious enough to 
change the energy industry in the desired way.467  To comprehensively 
meet the concerns of both perspectives, the national RPS approach will 
have to account for market forces,468 federalism,469 and hidden energy 
costs.470  If done correctly, a balance can be wrought between each of 
these. 
 
 464. This Note will use the terminology “two-tiered” to describe two distinct 
federally-mandated RPSs, one of which in effect is enforced against states.  This 
language is not to be confused with the use of “two-tiered” discussed by other 
authorities.  See, e.g., Rabe, supra note 343, at 26 (discussing the issues confronting 
federal and state collaboration in integrating one federal RPS with existing or future 
state models, calling the arrangement alternately a “two-tier” and, more accurately, a 
“multi-tier” RPS system). 
 465. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 14-15, 21. 
 466. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 5.  While different from one another in their 
design, RPSs that currently exist (1) stipulate a percentage or an amount of electricity to 
supplied; (2) define what constitutes a “qualifying renewable electricity source;” and (3) 
“over time, increases the percentage or amount of capacity or generation that must be 
provided from renewable sources to meet the standard.”  Id. 
 467. Cf. Sawin, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining that in quota systems, like the RPS, 
setting the target standard and the time in which it is to be achieved is crucial—that if 
the standard is too high, prices will rise “dramatically” and if it is too low, the desired 
economies of scale will fail to take root). 
 468. See van der Linden, supra note 180, at 47-48. 
 469. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 25-26 (explaining the difficulties of reconciling 
(a) the relationship between state policies; (b) the relationship between state and federal 
policies, in particular with regard to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3). 
 470. See, e.g. Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 3-5 (listing the following as “cost 
and pricing barriers”: “subsidies for competing fuels,” “high initial capital costs,” 
“difficulty of fuel price risk assessment,” “unfavorable power pricing rules,” 
“transaction costs,” and “environmental externalities”). 
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C. The Industry Perspective RPS: A Business-Friendly Approach to 
Revolution (in the Electricity Marketplace) 
The Industry RPS must be managed as a federal regulatory 
scheme.471  Congress, after setting a production standard, would have to 
pass an enabling statute that allows an agency (likely the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission) to certify and administer “renewable energy 
credits.”472  These credits represent one kilowatt hour of electricity each, 
and for each power generator and distributor, the RPS determines how 
many credits they must hold at the end of each fiscal year.473  If the RPS 
for a given year is 10%, each power retailer must have renewable source 
energy account for 10% of their total kilowatt hour sales for the year. 474  
The credits are proof of these sales.475  The credits would be tradable 
between industry actors as a parallel “commodity” to the electricity 
itself.476  The credits, while not per se indicative of sales, instead signify 
that renewable energy has been supported in the amount of one kilowatt 
hour per credit.477  Thus, a non-utility-owned wind farm (a power 
generator as opposed to a power retailer)478 in North Dakota that 
produces and sells only renewable energy would have 90% of that year’s 
credits to sell on the open market to power producers and distributors in 
any other part of the country that do not sell enough on their own.479
Credits would not be allowed to be carried over from year to year, 
and the market price would depend on how ambitious the annual 
increase in the RPS would be.480  In this way, every power retailer (like 
a utility) would have to determine whether it would be more expensive 
 
 471. See van der Linden et al., supra note 180, at 51 (asserting that a “strong . . .  
regulatory commitment” is needed for an RPS to be successful). 
 472. See Pater, supra note 168, at 36. 
 473. See RPS Overview, supra note 17. 
 474. See id. (using a 5% model); Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-6. 
 475. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 9. 
 476. See RPS Overview, supra note 17; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25 (explaining 
that the credit “could take the form of a piece of paper, like currency,” and that “[i]t 
would list the number of kilowatt-hours, the year and state of origin, and the type of 
generation (solar, wind, etc.)”). 
 477. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 24-25. 
 478. See id. at B-6. 
 479. See id. at 25 (“Since renewable generation companies produce the power, they 
would be the original owners of the [credits].”). 
 480. See van der Linden, supra note 180, at 47. 
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to produce their own renewable energy or directly subsidize the 
production of it elsewhere.481  Industry actors that fail to meet the 
standard would be subjected to steep fines that substantially outpace the 
fair market value of the energy credit, making the RPS effectively self-
enforcing.482  Another advantage is that unlike direct government 
subsidies, no public funding is necessary.483  Furthermore, it is effective 
in both regulated and competitive wholesale energy markets.484  The 
overseeing agency would merely be required to certify the annual 
ownership of the credits themselves, administer penalties for non-
compliance, and adjudicate disputes over credit transactions.485  The 
formula for setting fine rates would be set statutorily along with the RPS 
to avoid costly and time-consuming bureaucratic rule-making 
procedures.  The AWEA also notes that in an energy credit-based RPS 
scheme, the market value of credits will ultimately determine when the 
standard “self-sunsets.”486  Once a credit becomes worthless, the RPS 
will have accomplished its goal for at least the year.487  To ensure long-
term growth of the renewable energy industry, the RPS will have to start 
high enough, accelerate fast enough, over a long enough period of time 
to set off the diminishing rate of return for the credits.488
Special attention should be given to how the target for renewable 
electricity market share is set in establishing an implementation 
scheme.489  The congressional proposal of a 10% RPS by 2030 
submitted to the EIA for analysis, selects the desired percentage market 
share figure as the alterable variable.490  While round numbers are easier 
to understand, the quadrennial leap of first 100% (2.5% to 5%), then 
50% (5% to 7.5%), and finally 33% (7.5% to 10%) does not serve the 
renewables market well.491  The RPS should grow over time, but by 
 481. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25. 
 482. See RPS Overview, supra note 17. 
 483. See id. 
 484. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-6 to B-7. 
 485. See RPS Overview, supra note 17. 
 486. See id. 
 487. See id. 
 488. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4. 
 489. Id. 
 490. See EIA, 10% RPS Analysis, supra note 100, at 10 (setting a 2.5% share in first 
four years renewable credits are mandated, increasing to 5% for the next four years, 
7.5% for the next four years beyond that, and finally to 10% until the end of the 
initiative). 
 491. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4. 
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accelerating the standard this way, it does not provide the renewable 
electricity industry the chance to develop evenly over time.492  Rather, 
this Note asserts that arbitrarily addressing only the bottom-line mandate 
stresses the market.  Instead the relevant variable should be renewable 
electricity’s annual growth rate in market share so as to ease the standard 
into the market.  To be effective, the Industry RPS must give the 
regulated entities time to prepare sufficient business plans and strategies 
to either gather the assets needed to sell the requisite power outright or 
purchase the renewable energy credits on the market.493
The current market share of non-hydroelectric renewable electricity 
in terms of consumption is roughly 2.5%.494  According to the EIA’s 
latest projections, by 2010 that market share will be 3.95% which is 
where it is projected to stay with little fluctuation up to 2030.495  The 
goal of achieving a specified market share by a specified point in time is 
best met through an incrementally rising RPS.496  This Note proposes 
that Congress employ either of two methods, an Accelerated Growth 
Rate formula, or a market share compounded interest scheme. 
The Accelerated Growth Rate (“A.G.R.”) formula begins with the 
projected market share for renewables on a stipulated date, identifies an 
easy-to-meet initial target, and compounds that growth rate until the 
desired market share is reached.  The simplest derivation is a constant 
A.G.R., wherein the factor by which the annual growth rate is multiplied 
stays the same throughout the life of the RPS.  For illustration’s sake, a 
50% constant A.G.R. RPS could begin January 1, 2010 with a base-line 
 492. Id. 
 493. Cf. id. at B-4.  For the purposes of this discussion, qualifying electricity sources 
include wind, biomass (dedicated and cofiring plants), geothermal, solar-photovoltaic, 
solar-thermal, and municipal waste.  See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 
163.  Additionally, preexisting renewables facilities will be eligible for inclusion into 
the national RPS scheme and receive whatever share of renewable energy credits to 
which they are entitled upon the implementation of the mandate.  Id. 
 494. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. 
 495. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 163. 
 496. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4.  The actual numbers and market 
share percentages chosen for this example are electric utility consumption numbers 
(based on thermal conversion figures) and not net generation numbers (kilowatt-hours) 
in order to avoid confusion about the certification of credits, which signify sales (also in 
kilowatt-hours).  Id.  In reality, the choice of which market share figures to use are up to 
legislative discretion as is the acceleration formula.  Id. 
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renewable market share of 3.95% in utility consumption.497  The 
alterable variable the annual growth rate—will begin at 0.01%, meaning 
that by December 31, 2010, all electricity retailers must have enough 
renewable energy credits to satisfy 3.96% RPS.  The following year the 
0.01% growth rate will increase by a factor of 50% to 0.015%, so that by 
December 31, 2011 the RPS would sit at 3.98% (rounding to the nearest 
hundredth).  In 2012, the growth rate accelerates 50% to 0.023%, 
making the RPS 4.02%.  By 2015 the RPS is 4.15%, still only a 4.5% 
increase over the EIA’s projections.498 By starting small and 
compounding the RPS’s annual rate of increase, the A.G.R. formula 
backloads the standard and assures the market that a sufficient quantity 
of renewable energy credits will be available in the beginning to achieve 
total industry compliance.  By 2020, the growth rate would be 0.93%, 
leading to a seemingly modest 6.68% RPS, a mandate, but one that 
surpasses the expected 2020 market share by more than 69%.  At this 
point, the acceleration begins to show results, registering RPSs of 8.08% 
in 2021, 10.18% in 2022, 13.33% in 2023, 18.06% in 2024, and 25.16% 
by December 31, 2025—a nearly 520% higher market share than 
projected. 
Setting a constant A.G.R. like 50% is the simplest method of 
implementing the standard with an eye for incremental progress while 
providing industry participants the chance to adapt over time to the new 
market.  A more complex accelerated growth rate formula can be used to 
speed up or slow down the desired achievement of RPS milestones.  For 
instance, if in using the same 3.95%-0.01% base in 2010, the initial rate 
increase is 100% for the first two years with lowering rate increases by a 
factor of 10% every two years (2013 and 2014 at 90% growth increase, 
2015 and 2016 at 80%, etc.), the 2015 RPS would be 4.49%, increasing 
to 25.08% at 2022, roughly the same standard the 50% scheme reached, 
only three years earlier. 
The sun-setting of the RPS, designed to be a function of the 
market,499 kicks in at whatever percentage the statute sets as its ultimate 
goal for renewable market infiltration.500  If, for example, 25% were the 
figure Congress had chosen, in the 50% constant A.G.R. formula 
 497. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 138, 163. 
 498. Id. at 163.  The projections referenced are based on current and expected future 
consumption numbers as compiled by the Energy Information Administration.  Id. 
 499. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-5. 
 500. Obviously, if renewable-based electricity accounted for 100% of power 
production, the energy credits would be worthless, rendering the RPS moot. 
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scenario, the acceleration would cease after 2025.  In the staggered 
acceleration growth rate formula, 2022 would be the end date.  At that 
point Congress could either elect to maintain that 25% as its final RPS, 
enact a more limited growth formula, or arbitrarily set a final standard 
number.  Once the acceleration ends and Congress finalizes the standard, 
the end game of the Industry RPS begins. 
The other RPS structure that avoids the abrupt increases of the 2003 
congressional proposal is one that mirrors any interest rate compounded 
annually.501  Using the initial market share as the principle (present 
value), long-term RPS goal as the future value, the period over which 
the compounding runs, and the rate of the annual increase, the market 
share compounded interest approach provides a considerably faster start 
than the A.G.R. formulae mentioned above, including a 7.28% RPS in 
2015—between 60% and 70% higher than either of the two 
demonstrated A.G.R. scenarios.  The drawback to this approach is that it 
does not provide the same slow start as the A.G.R. permutations, 
potentially exposing under-prepared retailers to heavy non-compliance 
penalties.  By 2025, what began as a fast start for the interest 
compounding formula comes in at nearly 25% three years after the 
staggered A.G.R. approach and one year before the 50% constant 
A.G.R. 
The difference between the implementation schemes is one of 
strategy and simplicity.  The compounding interest formula is more 
parsimonious, but the A.G.R formulae allow for a broad-based and 
conservative phase-in over at least the first seven years of the RPS with 
an option to ramp up the acceleration once the “getting-to-know-you” 
period is over.  Either structural method, however, represents an 
improvement over the arbitrarily-rounded legislative targets of the 2003 
proposal.502
D. The Social Perspective RPS: Because the World Does Need Saving 
Renewable energy is more than simply a business.  For that reason, 
this Note proposes an end-user-oriented, demand-side Social RPS to go 
along with the industry version.  Fossil fuels are responsible for millions 
 
 501. The formula is expressed as follows: RPS or Target Market Share = Current 
Market Share (1 + annual rate of increase)^Term.  For this example, a 25% RPS over a 
15-year term is expressed as: 25% = 3.95% (1+ r)^15; r = 0.13 in this case. 
 502. See EIA, 10% RPS Analysis, supra note 100, at 10 
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of dollars in health care costs,503 a host of environmental and economic 
catastrophes,504 and even national security vulnerabilities.505  The push 
for a renewable portfolio standard given this set of concerns necessarily 
requires a different mode of implementation from the business-centered 
standard.  The Industry RPS, its tailored execution structure 
notwithstanding, simply uses energy credits as a means to act on those 
who sell power.506  The Social RPS makes use of renewable energy 
credits as well, but the relevant actors here are not utilities or 
independent power producers, but American states.  Through the 
commodification of energy credits, even in a scheme that backloads 
implementation, power retailers that lack renewable assets will more 
often than those holding such assets choose to purchase credits on the 
market.507  The risk that the social costs of fossil fuel production will be 
increasingly concentrated in certain regions is significant.508  Given that 
renewable energy sources have geographic restraints, their production 
and distribution hubs will initially, in all likelihood, be sited at a greater 
distance from end-users than their larger-market-share fossil fuel 
competitors.509
 503. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 22. 
 504. See generally IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 505. See Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148 (speaking specifically of petroleum 
in this instance, the president declared America’s dependence on “unstable 
governments” for energy sources a “national security issue”). 
 506. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 24-25, B-4 to B-7. 
 507. See Pater, supra note 168, at 34.  States with an RPS using renewable energy 
credits form what is called a “compliance market,” the value of which was 
approximated at $137 million in 2004, and is expected to rise to $608 million in 2010.  
Id.  This level of growth proves the existence and durability of the market, signifying as 
a matter of course that these credits have buyers who are unwilling or unable to acquire 
their own renewable energy assets.  Id. 
 508. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 14-15, 21. 
 509. See Nogee et al., supra note 3 (including: (1) solar power, whose utility-scale 
plants need 7.5 acres of mirrors for one megawatt, or one square mile for an 85 
megawatt plant, id. at A-3, with deserts representing the viable siting option, id.; (2) 
wind power, which is concentrated in some of the least populated areas of the country, 
id. at A-4 to A-5; (3) biomass, which has no presence in the mountain west or west 
coast, id. at A-7; (4) geothermal, located mainly in California and Nevada, id. at A-8; 
and (5) hydro-power, which needs sufficient water flow and has significant regulatory 
restrictions, id. at A-9 to A-10); see also Rabe, supra note 195, at 23 (arguing that the 
biggest problem confronting Texas’s RPS is the need to construct more transmission 
capacity to move wind power electricity from its collection point to higher end-use 
population centers). 
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The Industry RPS only acts on businesses, not individuals and not 
geographic entities.510  While the aggregate nation-wide market share of 
renewables would certainly increase under this standard, its positive 
social benefits like lower emissions are not evenly spread out either 
geographically or throughout the population.511  Therefore, the Social 
RPS will seek to accomplish the overall reduction of fossil fuel 
emissions across the board, not for the sake of the renewable energy 
industry, but for the sake of health of its people and environment.  To do 
so, it will have to act on the states by mandating end-use consumption or 
purchase rates, rather than production or sales rates.  While matters 
relating to the consumption of energy could constitutionally be justified 
as within the realm of the Commerce Clause,512 this Note finds that the 
most effective way to avoid legal challenge513 and ensure the successful 
reduction of fossil fuel externalities is to condition certain federal 
funding to the states on the timely compliance with the standard.  Just as 
Congress conditioned a percentage of federal highway aid for each state 
on the raising of its drinking age to 21 during the 1980s,514  Congress 
would declare that it will release funding packages for highway, 
education, homeland security, and all other necessary state aid only upon 
the certification of the required number of renewable energy credits for 
that fiscal year. 
As with the Industry RPS, the Social version will be implemented 
using a rate-compounding formula to ensure that state legislatures have 
the opportunity to weigh their own options and adjust over time.  
 510. Cf. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-1. 
 511. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 17.  An “argument against” a quota system like an 
RPS is that it would “[c]oncentrate development in areas with the best resources, 
causing possible opposition to projects and missing many of the benefits associated 
with renewable energy (jobs, economic development in rural areas, reductions in local 
pollution).”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 512. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2007) (declaring the business 
of transmitting and selling electricity “for ultimate distribution to the public” to be 
“affected with the public interest,” and that the wholesale electricity market is under 
Congress’s interstate commerce regulatory authority). 
 513. Cf. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ 
Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 507, 578 (2004) (discussing the limits and role of the 
federal government in energy market regulation). 
 514. National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub. L. No. 98-363 § 6(a) (codified as 
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2007)). 
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Certainly, states could seek to carry the brunt of the purchasing and 
consumption requirement on themselves through mandating renewable 
energy use on government property.515  A state could choose instead to 
regulate municipal utilities,516 enact their own RPS if they haven’t done 
so already, or draft incentives for renewable energy producers to move 
to their state.517  In light of the disparate nature of states, their relative 
geographic advantages, and populations, the Social RPS would 
necessarily have to be a lower standard, enacted more slowly than its 
commercially-oriented counterpart.  States which already have their own 
version of an RPS are not restricted in any way from enforcing it, as 
long as the state does not drop below the mandates consumption/ 
purchase floor set by the federal Social RPS.518
Like the Industry RPS, renewable energy credits would be tradable 
commodities under the Social tier, but in order to marginalize the trading 
so as not to defeat the purpose of ameliorating externalities, a substantial 
percentage surcharge akin to a sales tax will be added to the purchase 
price of each credit.  A smaller surcharge will be added to the Industry 
RPS, and the proceeds of both surcharges will go into the national 
system benefits fund.  The percentage of the fund’s non-investment 
revenue attributable to these surcharges should be earmarked to fund 
infrastructural projects like the “wind pipeline” that improve overall 
transmission access and energy efficiency so as to broaden the 
interconnectivity of the national power grid.519  In so doing, it will help 
control for output variations while directly encouraging the proliferation 
of renewable power.520
 
 515. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 111 (2001) (requiring 20% of the energy 
purchases for a building owned, leased, or operated by a state agency come from 
renewable sources of energy by 2010). 
 516. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 19.29A.090 (2002) (requiring all utilities, 
including municipal and investor-owned utilities to provide an option to consumers to 
purchase electricity from “qualified alternative energy resources”). 
 517. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.32B (2003) (enacting a per-square-footage 
tax credit for the new construction of wind turbines). 
 518. Cf. National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub. L. No. 98-363 § 6(a) (codified as 
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2007)). 
 519. See Caldwell, supra note 206. 
 520. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Current market trends indicate that the status quo of a fossil fuel-
based electricity sector is expected to endure well into this century.521  
While concerns about supply disruptions due to geopolitical worries are 
more prevalent in other energy sectors,522 the high external social and 
environmental costs attributable to coal and to a lesser extent natural 
gas523  have stimulated a national discussion.524  Despite the projections 
that at current rates renewable power will remain relegated to marginal-
player status,525 renewable energy investors have reason to be optimistic 
in light of the success of green marketing programs526 and nation-wide 
growth of state incentives.527  Also important is the fact that in the last 
thirty years, awareness of global climate change,528 the health effects of 
exposure to pollution,529 and the devastating effect toxic emissions have 
on the natural world530 has become more acute.531  Correspondingly, 
Congress and many states use the power of the purse to influence the 
direction and trajectory of renewable energy progress.532  On the federal 
level, tax incentives, research grants, and low-interest loan programs are 
aimed at stimulating investment in renewable energy industries.533  
States began implementing their own policies as well to encourage 
renewable energy businesses to set up shop within their borders.534  
However, as policy turned to progress for renewables, the government 
was still financing the polluters,535  whose costs decreased through the 
 521. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14. 
 522. Cf. id. at 70 (discussing how geopolitical instability restricts petroleum supply, 
a major energy source for the transportation sector in particular). 
 523. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 9. 
 524. See Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148. 
 525. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14. 
 526. See Blair & Swezey, supra note 21, at 5. 
 527. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20. 
 528. See IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 529. See Schneider, supra note 1. 
 530. See IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 531. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 4. 
 532. See supra notes 217-332. 
 533. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 10 (classifying such programs as “cost-
reduction policies” whose purpose was to provide incentives for private investment). 
 534. Id. 
 535. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22. 
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1980s and 1990s,536 rendering ineffectual certain pro-renewables 
programs.537
Of all the alternative energy sources, perhaps the slowest start was 
had by wind.538  Hydro power had waterfalls and dams,539  solar power 
and geothermal had immediate sources of funding,540 and biomass could 
be mixed with coal and still be considered in the same league as the 
other “green” sources.541  Nonetheless, through government-sponsored 
technological development,542 and incentivization policies, wind power 
grew faster than any of its peers.543  Innovations in turbine design544 
coupled with favorable local and national policies545 should have this 
industry gaining market share as long as its production tax credit stays in 
effect.546  Furthermore, enormous growth in Europe mixed with 
enormous potential in the United States indicates that wind energy is 
coming of age. 547  With a viable market548 and a history of reacting well 
to government initiative,549 the wind power industry is on the rise,550 but 
like all renewables,551  has obstacles to overcome.552  Transmission costs 
and output variability can all be accounted for with common sense 
 536. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135. 
 537. See Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry, supra note 168, at 51 
(attributing the decline of PURPA to the ). 
 538. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 665, 662-663 (showing how 
wind-specific programs did not come about until 1980, and how wine power capacity 
did not begin to rise in earnest until the late 1990s). 
 539. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-9. 
 540. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 661. 
 541. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7. 
 542. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-3. 
 543. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the “market for wind power 
generation is rapidly expanding, due largely to decreasing technological costs and 
institution of government incentives”); see also AWEA, Wind Energy Basics, supra 
note 130 (indicating that in 2005 and 2006, no other renewable energy source had more 
new generating capacity installed in the United States). 
 544. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-3. 
 545. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 4. 
 546. See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 1. 
 547. See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109. 
 548. See supra notes 165-206. 
 549. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 39. 
 550. Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109 (noting that the value of new 
generating installations in 2006 alone, are worth $23 billion). 
 551. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 3-6. 
 552. See Caldwell, supra note 195. 
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regulation, infrastructural improvements, and fair access rules,553 but 
private investment is the real key to ensuring long-term growth for 
renewable power industries.554  So too is the need to reduce or eliminate 
fossil fuel subsidies555 and demand that social costs be accounted for.556
Indeed, this is an opportunity to win both private wealth and public 
health.  If the need to craft energy legislation is indeed analogous to 
war,557 then a national campaign must be undertaken using markets as a 
battle plan, laws as weapons, and investors as soldiers.  The barriers 
addressed in this Note can be marginalized through a comprehensive 
energy policy on the federal level, including a system benefits fund and 
two-tiered renewable portfolio standard.558  Furthermore, long-term 
commitments to supply-side policies like tax credits and capital 
assistance programs are necessary to ensure the successful cleansing of 
the American energy industry.559  In the energy war, wind power is a 
battlefield where ground has been gained.  When a breeze from the 
direction of a power plant no longer carries toxins, but the promise of 
clean electricity, victory is in the offing. 
 
 553. See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 4. 
 554. Cf. Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 555. Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22. 
 556. Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining that investors will often not 
take social costs into account, despite the adverse impacts fossil fuels have on health 
and the environment). 
 557. See supra note 213. 
 558. See supra notes 443-520. 
 559. Sawin, supra note 22, at 26-27. 
